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AllSTRACl 
I'his thesis examines the termination of the Navy's A- 12 Program. Specifically, the 
research sought to answer the question: \Vere the A- 12 Program's cost overruns 
exceptional when compared to other major acquisitions? Prior research indicates that 
most major programs experience some degree of cost variance. To determine if the 
A-12's overruns were exceptional, the A-12 Program and 58 other contracts for 
developmental work arc compared, The conclusion of the research is the A-12's overruns 
were exceptional. The cost overruns in the A-12 Program, at termination, exceeded 97 
percent of other programs examined . To complete the Program may have cost between $9 
and $11 bil lion. The required budget adjustment to complete the A-12 Program was 
greater than 91 percent of other programs. The research found no difference between 
cost variances of!ixed-price contracts and cost-type contracts. The assertion that the use 
of a fixed -price contract contributed to the failure of the program was not proven, There 
was also no statistical difference between the cost overruns of aircraft programs and other 
types ofprograrns, The Government's decision to terminate the A-1 2 Program for cost 
ovenuns is justified. based on the sample of programs examined 
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On 7 January 1991. Secretary ofDefen~e Richard Cheney announced the 
tennination for default of the Full-Scale Development contract for the Na\)"s A- 12 
Avenger program. The Secretary of Defense cited cost ovemms and schedule slips in his 
decision to cancel the A-12. The program was estimated 10 be $1 billion over cost and 
more than one year behind ~hedule. The Na\)"s internal investigation of the program. 
The Beach Report , cited numerous problems with the program [Ref. 2] 
In the same year Congressional Oversight Conunitlees reviewed the Air Force's 
C- 17 acquisition program. This program, like the A-12, was a fixed-price contract for 
development. In November of 1991 it was estimated to be at least $1 billion over cost and 
one year behind schedule. While the A-12 progranl was terminated, the C-17 continued 
into product ion 
The Wall Street Journal called the litigation of the A-12 program the most costly 
case in history with legal costs alone running $30 million per year [Ref 28, 27 July 1994}. 
At stake is over $3 billion in taxpayer money, including $1.35 hillion in overpayment of 
progress pa~1nents and a contractor claim of$19 billion. On 9 December 1994, U.S 
Claims Court Judge Robert Hodges vacated the Tennination for Default and urged the 
Navy and the contraclOrs 10 reach a settlement [Ref. 28, 12 December 19941. The Navy 
has decided to pursue the case in court and the case is expected to be heard in November 
of 1995 
B. PURPOSE 
1. Tht-Sis Objectives 
The intent oflhis research is to answer a straightforward question: Were the 
Navy's A- 12 cost overruns exceptional when compared to other major acquisitions? The 
answer to this question is intended to be simple: yes or no. It is apparent from the history 
of major aircraft acquisitions that cost and schedule ovenuns alone do not account for the 
termination of programs This research examines the cost variances within the A- 12 
program, in comparison with other major acquisitions_ Cost ovemms can be attributable 
to many factors such as poor cost estimation, poor management or technical difticulty 
The potential for costs overrunning the ceiling price was recognized within a year of the 
start of Full-Scale Development (FSO). According to an analyst at the Office of the 
Under Secretary ofOefense for Acquisition and Technology (OUSO A&T), earlier 
accounting for these costs may have kept the program al ive_ [Ref 4] 
2. Research Questions 
Primary Research Question: Were the cost overruns on the A-12 contract 
exceptional when compared to other major aircraft acquisitions and other major defense 
acquisitions? 
Subsidiary Resellrch Questions: 
(I) What would the A-12 FSO program have cost if it continued to completion? 
(2) Was the Secretary of Oefense justified in canceling the A-\2 program? 
(3) Are there dinerences in cost overruns between fixed-price contracts and 
cost-type contracts? 
(4) Do differences exist in cost overruns of aircraft acquisitions and other major 
acquisitions? 
(5) What is the average cost ovemm of a developmental contract? 
3. Expected Benefit 
This research is intended to determine if cost ovemms in the A-12 program 
justified the termination for default when compared to other major aircraft acquisition 
programs The primary benefit of this study is to provide insight into the effects of rust 
variances_ This research provides the program manager with comparison data that can 
provide reference points for progress 
4. Boundaries 
Only contracts for developmental pro~\TamS are examined No comparison is 
attempted to programs in earlier or later phases, and the reader is cautioned that 
techniques used in this study may not be applicable to other phases of the acquisition 
process While there arc studies that indicate many programs experience cost and 
schedule variances, this study specifically examines the role of these variances in the 
decision to terminate the Navy's A-12 Avenger program 
The intent of this research is 10 examine cost overruns in the 1\-12 program and 
provide a statistically valid finding on whether the A- J2 program experienced 
eX1:raordinary cost overruns. The methodology uses non-linear cost estimation models and 
non-parametric statistics. Recognizing that some readers oft/tis study may not be familiar 
with these techniques many of the details of the computations are not include<! in the text 
Except where required for background or clarity, the detai led methodology may be found 
in Appendix B 
S. Limitations and Consiraints 
The contracts included in this research had to meet several criteria First. the 
contract had to be for the Engim,-ering and Manufacturing Development (EMD) phase, 
previously designated the rull-Scale Development phase. (For continuity, the current 
designation of Phase II of the acquisition process will be used.) Second, the program had 
to meet the requirements to be an Acquisition Category ill (ACAT ill) program. That is, 
at least $200 million in Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT &E) funds, in 
1980 constant dollars, had to have been committed to the program [Ref 7]. Third, the 
program must have achieved a significant degree of completion. The significant degree of 
completion was seleded to he 40 percent 
Only contracts from the Defense Acquisition Executive Sununary (DAES) 
database were examined. Contracts for smaller programs were not examined 
The determination of estimates at completion used a non-linear cost estimation 
model commonly called the Rayleigh Distribution. Tltis model has the ability to provide 
estimates at completion that are independent of current budgets. There are many other 
models that provide estimates at completion that were not examincd due to tim..: 
constraints. No attempt is made to provide a general model for predicting costs at 
completion 
The use of contractual information from the DAES datahase was contingent upon 
an agreement not to identify the contract or the contractor. Therefore, the contracts 
contained in Appendix A are listed by number for identification. Permission from OUSD 
(A&l) is required prior to release of the database. The database used in this research was 
transferred to the Systems Management Department of the Naval Postgraduate School 
6, Assu mptions 
The approach used for this study was an examination of cost data from multiple 
contracts to detennine if there were significant differences that would account for the 
termination ofthe A-12 based on cost variances. Cost infonnation was obtained from the 
DAES database. Despite the judgmental selection of the contracts, an assumption is made 
that the contracts drawn from the database are representative of the population 
The use of the Rayleigh Distribution for estimating the cost at completion of the 
A-12 program is based on prior research that indicates this model accurately represents 
the expenditures ofa EMD program. It is assumed, based on past research, that the A-12 
program can be modeled using the Rayleigh Distribution 
The effects of inflation were considered during the research. Inflation would have 
no impact on the cost variance between Budgeted eOS\ of Work Perfonned (BCWP) and 
the Actual Cost ofWark Perfonned (ACWP) . If these two figures were inflated to a base 
year amount the cost variance would remain the same. The second area inflation was 
considered is in determining adjustments to the Contract Budget Base. An assumption is 
made that contractors base the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BeWS) and the 
Estimate At Completion (EAC) on predictions of future price escalation. This assumption 
was confirmed by a prior program manager lor Lockheed and by a cost analyst with the 
Cost Analysis Improvement Gruup (CAlG) No adjustments are made for inflation 
C. METHODOLOGY 
1. A - !2 Cost Estimation 
The estimates at compk.>tion for the A-12 were dL'Velopcd using a variant of the 
Rayleigh Distrihution model. This model is defined in detail in Chapter n The decision 
to use the Rayleigh model to estimate the completion cost is based on prior research 
conducted by Abernethy [Ref I], Elrod [Ref II], Lee [Ref 18], Gallagher [Ref 14] and 
Watkins [Ref 29] 
2. The Contract Rudget Base 
The use of cost varianccs alone does not provide a complete pictun: A program 
that experiences significant cost variances will need an adjustment to its Contract Rudget 
Base (CBB) ifit is to continue. Ideally, there would be no cost variances within a 
program and no requi rement to adju~t the CBB 130th cost variances and CBR 
adjustments arc examined in this research 
3. Data Sources 
Ihc data used for this study were drawn from 58 separate contra"is for 
developmental work. Contract information was obtained from the OUSD (A&T) 
Supporting data were drawn from a variety of sources as listed in the references 
4. Hypotheses 
a, Hypothesis 1: Cost overruns in the A-12 Program were no greater than 
the average cost ovemms in the sample This hypothesis was tested to determine if the 
A-12 cost variances and CBB adjustments were statistically different than other major 
programs 
b. Hypothesis 2: ~fp =o~, There are no differences in the cost variances of 
fixed-price contracts and cost-type contracts 
c. Hypothesis 3: !-l.d, ~ ~",~, There are no differences between cost 
variances of contracts for aircraft and other contracts in the sample 
d Hypothe~is 4: ~ cwp = ~l,bb, ' There are no differences in the 
adjustments to the Contract Budg<:t Base for fixed-price contracts and the adjustments to 
the Contract Budget Base for cost-type contracts 
e , Hypothesis 5: ~,_. == ~'b!"'J'I1"!' . There are no differences in the 
adjustments to the Contract Budget Base of aircraft programs and other programs in the 
sample 
Where ~I""", ,< = the mean of the sample of ACAT ID contracts. ~"'" = the mean of 
air(;rafi contracts . ~fr = the mean of fixed-price contra(;ts, and ~l , = the mean of cost 
contracts, Hypotheses four and five include the subscript CBB. Hypotheses four and five 
tested the contra(;t budget bast! adjustments from the indicated samples 
5. Procroure to Tf"st thf" Hypotheses 
a. Hypothesis I was tested using the data from the A-12 reports and tbe 
data from the sample contracts The data were me1Ciured at complelion points frum 0 to 
100 percent complcte measured by dollars expended. The A-12 data will be compared 
based on percentile rankings 
b. Hypotheses 2 thru 5 were tested using non-parametric statistics. The 
Mann-Whitney test was chosen for its ease of use. The data do not support an assumption 
ofnonnality that would allow a t-test. Alpha was set at .05 
6. Justification of Methodology 
Prior research confinned that the Rayleigh Distribution patterns the expenditures in 
developmental programs. Elrod [Ref. 11] tested the ability of the Rayleigh Distribution to 
provide estimates at completion for aircraft programs and found that the Rayleigh 
Distribution can be used for this purpose. Lee [Ref IS] developed a technique using the 
Rayleigh model to detennine budgets for developmental programs. Gallagher [Ref. 14] 
developed a methodology that provided probabilities of ending cost estimates for 
developmental programs based on the Rayleigh Distribution 
The cost data from the A-12 program were used to detennine a percentile value 
based on the distribution that best patterns the data. 13estFit, a commercial statistical 
software package was used to detennine the distributions based on Chi-squared values 
The software evaluates the data versus IS distributions to provide a range of JXlssible 
distributions that model the data Appendix B contains complete infonnation on the 
modeling of the data. 
Testing non-nonnal distributed data requires tests not dependent on the parameters 
of the distribution. A non-parametric test is required for testing hypotheses on cost 
variance data. Cost variances for programs patterned a left skewed distribution. The 
addition of more data points did not nonnalizc the distribution, This intuitively makes 
sense, if one considers there is little incentive for underruns in a program 
In detennining whether the cost variances of the A-12 were exceptional it is 
important to determine the eBB adjustments for other programs. Hypotheses four and 
five tested whether certain contracts or programs experienced greater adjustments to the 
budget than other programs 
D. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A review of the available literature revealed no directly related past effort The 
most widely cited source in analyzing the failure of the A-12 program is the "Beach 
Report" IRef 2] 
The Beach Report examined issues that contributed to the failure of the A-12 
program. Specifically, the Beach Report sought answers to three questions, "Did the 
Navy ... have reason to anticipate substantial additional cost increase ... at the time of the 
Major Aircraft. Review? If not, why not? If so, were senior DON and DoD leaders 
sufficiently apprised in the course of the Review?" [Ref 2: p. 2] The report concluded 
that su[fi(;ient cost perfonnance data existed to indicate that the contract would have 
significant overruns and the Program Manager ", .. erred in judgment by failing to anticipate 
substantial additional cost increase beyond the ceiling of the FSD contract .. " [Ref 2: r 
29] 
Previous studies have examined the affects of cost and schedule overruns on 
contract costs at completion. Dr, David S. Chri~ten;;cn, an Associate Professor of 
Accounting at The Air Force Institute ofTeclrnology, examined 64 (;Qntracts of various 
types and programs and the ability ofa program to recover from cost overruns at various 
stages [Ref 3], Using a linear regression model, Christensen tested the hypothesis that 
contracts were unlikdy to recover from cost overruns His results indicated that programs 
experiencing cost overruns, at a stage of completion between 10 to 70 percent, were 
highly unlikely to finish within the programmed cost baseline. Funhennore, he found that 
the type of contract used, the Service managing the program and the type of weapon being 
acquired had no significant bearing on the cost overrun incurred in the program. IRef 3] 
Christensen's work l'Volved from observations made by Mr. Gary Christie and Mr 
Wayne Abba, senior program analysts in l.he OUSD (A&T). Abba and ChristIe examined 
data extraCled from the DAES database on 500 contracts and concluded there is very little 
ehance of recovering from a cost overrun once a program is more than 15% complete 
"Given a contract is more than 15 percent complete, the overrun at completion will not be 
less than the overrun to date, and the percent overrun at wmpletion Y-li H be greater than 
the percent overrun to date. ,. fRet'. 3] 
E. REVIEW OF PRIOR RESEARCH 
Two master's theses from the Air Force Institute of Technology, Captain Scott R 
Heise, A Rn'i£.'w o/Cos/ Peifonnance Index Stability [Ref 17], and Captain Brian D 
Wilson, An Analysis ojCofUmct Cost Overrlllls and Their Impacts [Ref 301, examined 
cost perfonnance data from contracts 
Captain Heise's research examined at what point the Cumulative Cost Performance 
Index (CPlcum) is considered to be stable. Data from the Office oflhe Under Secretary 
of Defense (Acquisition & Technology) indicate that the CPI is normally stable at the SO 
percent program completion point, and the cumulative CPI docs not improve between 
program completion points of IS percent to 85 percent. Captain Heise's hypothesis was 
that the CPI is stable when a program is greater than SO percent complete. His definition 
of stability was that the CPI would not vary by more than plus or minus 10 percent 
Using data extracted from the DAES database, Heise examined ISS contracts 
The eontral.1:s included various acquisition phases and contract types. His conclusion was 
the cumulative CPI is stable at the SO percent point and will stabilize as early as the 20 
percent completion point if the program maintains a stable baseline. Additionally, Captain 
Heise found that the cumulative CPI tends to worsen to some degree as the program 
continues, but not beyond the bounds of what is considered a stable CPI. His conclusions 
confiml previous work by Abba and Christie, that there is very little chance of recovery 
from a program cost overrun between the 15 percent and 85 percent completion points 
[Ref 17] 
Captain Brian D. Wilson's research investigated Christie's assertion that of500 
contracts examined since 1977, the cost oveoun at completion would be higher than the 
cost overrun to date. Captain Wilson examined 65 contracts, aU of which had experienced 
cost overruns. His findings confirmed the claim. He also found that the cost ovenuns 
tend to increase as the program progresses. Captain Wilson's statistical research was 
performed at an 85 percent confidence level. [Ref 30] 
Two master's th~scs from the Naval Postgraduate School were used for 
background information on the application of the Rayleigh Distribution to developmental 
programs Abernethy [Ref. I], investigated the applicability of the Rayleigh Distrihution 
to programs and Elrod [Ref. I I], tested the ability of the Rayleigh Distribution to provide 
estimates at completion 
Abernethy's work examined completed contracts to test the ability ofthe Rayleigh 
Distribution to model expenditures. The results showed that thc cxpenditures of most 
contracts were modeled by the Rayleigh Distribution, but the predi(.."tive capability of the 
model was insufficient lor use in obtaining accurate cost at completion estimates [Ref I] 
Elrod tested the predictive capability ofthe Rayleigh Distribution using two 
methods to determine which method provided the best predictions of final cost. Her 
sample included aircraft programs that had been completed. Elrod's results showed that 
either of the two models could be used to predict fmal costs. The model used in this 
research approximates the Putnam model exrunined by Elrod. [Ref. IIJ 
Two unpublished rcsearch papers were relied upon to provide an understanding of 
the application of the Rayleigh model. , The first paper, Determining a Budget Profile from 
a R&D Cost Estimate, by David A. Lee el. aJ l Ref. 18 J, provided verification that the 
Rayleigh model patterned the expenditures in a developmental program as well as a simple 
description of the model. This paper is available in the Defense TechnicaJ Information 
Center (OTIC) database 
The second paper, Fmal-Cost Estlmales/or Research & Development Programs 
Condit;om:d on Realized Costs, by Mark A. GaJlagher and David A. Lee IRef. 14], 
provided a software tool that was used 10 dC\-'elop estimates at completion for the A-12 
program and cumulative probabilities of occurrence. This paper is aJso available in the 
DnC database, and was presented at the 1995 Military Operations Research Society 
Symposium 
F. SUMMARY 
rhls Chapter presented the objectives of the research and the hypothe~s to be 
tcsted Most programs experience cost overruns. Were the cost overruns in the A-12 
Program any different than othcr programs? 
rhe following chapters will provide the foundation to answer the question 
Chapters II and III will present the generaJ backf,rround information on the Acquisition 
Process and the A-12 Program Chapter IV contains the data from the 58 contracts drawn 
from the DAES database_ Chapter V is the analysis of the data and the determination of 
where the A-12 Program was at versus other major acquisitions. Chapter VI reviews the 




This chapter provides an overview of the acquisition process as it is curreOliy 
structured, and a summary oflhe Cost/Schedule Control Systems Criteria. This chapter 
also introduces techniques for estimating costs at completion for an EMD program. 
The intent of this chapter is to provide the reader with sufficient hackground in the 
current Defense acquisition process, and cost estimating procedures, to better understand 
the events leading up to the termination of the A- 12. The Acquisition Process information 
is drawn fromOMB Circular A-109, and the DoD 5000 Series 
D. THE ACQUlSmON PROCESS 
I, The DoD 5000 Series 
The DoD 5000 series is a set of directives and instructions issued in 1991 . The 
series consists of DoD Directive 5000. 1, Defense Acquisition [Ref. 6]; DoD Instruction 
5000.2, Defense Acquisition Management Policies and Procedures [Ref. 71; and 000 
Manual 5000.2-M, Defense AcquisitiollManagement Documents and Reports. These 
replaced the 1987 versions of DoDD 5000.1 and DoDI 5000,2. 
All the military depanments Me subject to the b'llidance provided in the 5000 
series which provide a single acquisition system for all defense acquisition programs. The 
5000 series is implemented in a phased process with five major milestones, as shown in 
Figure L [Ref 6] 
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2. The Mission Need 
The acquisition process begins with the identification ofa deficiency in current 
tacti(;s or equipment that can only be satisfied with the procurement of equipment 1 )000 
5000,1 requires that a new acquisition be initiated only aller "tully examining alternative 
ways of satisrying identified military needs." The priority in examining alternatives as 
specified in DoDD 5000.1 is: [Ref. 6] 
J, Use or modification of an existing {],S, military system 
2 Lse or modification of an existing commc[(;ially developed or Allied 
system that losters a non-developmental acquisition strategy 
3. A cooperative research and development program with one or more 
Allied nations 
4. A new Joint-Service development program 
5, A new Servi(;e.unique development program 
The increasing sophistication of threat air defense systems degraded the capability 
and sur.·ivability of the A-6. The concept exploration for the A-J2 began at the end orthe 
cold war and was focused on penetrating Soviet-type air defense systems using low 
observabLe (stealth) technology, The United States Air tor(;e (USAF) systems that 
incorporated stealth tcchnology were not suitable lor carrier operations without significant 
structural modification that would result in a new aircraft [i'om what was originally 
designed for USAF missions 
The initiation ofthe A-12 program was based on projected USAF purchases of the 
aircraft in larger quantities than the Navy. Although this wouLd not be a tme "joint" 
program, the A-12 procurement was based on two Service's needs 
The Services submit the Mission Need Statement (MNS) to a Joint Requirements 
Oversight Council (JROC). The JROC determines if the need can be satisfied by other 
means, The JROe detem-unes the validity of the need and fonvards the l\1NS to the 
OUSD (A&T) for approval or disapproval 
The A-12 Program began in 1984 with approval ofMJlestone 0, approval for 
concept studie5. The 'Xavy contracts for Concept Exploration were awarded to the 
contractor teams of McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics and Northrop/Grumman 
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3. Phase 0 
Phase 0 is Concept Exploration and Definition During tlus phase the priority is to 
develop and evaluate various alternatives that could sati~f).· requirements. In Phase 0 
initial cost estimates arc conducted to detennine the affordability of the proposed systems 
rrade-ofTs arc considered between cost and performance. The contract for Phase 0 in the 
A-12 program was issued in 1984, Phase 0 aflhe acquisition process begins with 
Milestone 0, and approval arlhe Mission Need Statement (MNS) 
0001 5000.2 requires that during tlus phase plans must be made for competitive 
pro\ol)'ping unless Ihe OUSD (A&T) decides that it is not practical Plans must also be 
made to allow for competitive development and production 
4. Phase I 
Milestone I is the start of a new acquisition program for ACAT ill programs 
ACA T ill programs are defined as programs that will expend mure than $200 million in 
1980 constant dollars in RDT&E or the e,,;penditure for procurement of more than $1 
billion in 1980 constant dollars. The decision authority to start a new program is the 
OUSV (A&T). The most promising designs from Phase 0 are carried forward into Phase 
J, the Demonstration and Validation Phase 
The Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) reviews the program at each milestune to 
detennine if it meets the requirements to proceed to the neld: milestone If a new program 
is required, the parameters for the developntent of the system are established and 
approved 
The threat is re-evaluated at Milestone I to ensure the requirements for the 
program still exist and have not changed. Total costs of the program are refined and 
aftordability issues are considered. The intent of the Milestone decision is to ensure that a 
new program is not started when other means can satisfy the need 
The A-12 Program entered Phase I in 1986, with the award of the Demonstration 
and Validation (;Qntract to McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics and 
i'\orthrop/Grumman; the same teams that had conducted the concept exploration studies 
lJ 
Phase I continues to define the critical design characteristics and projected 
ca pabilities ofthe system. Projected costs of the system are further defined as the 
program proceeds through the Demonstration and Validation Phase 
Risk is considered throughout the phases, hut at this point the degree of risk of 
incorporating new technologies should be carefully considered. AI the conclusion of 
Phase T the design to enter the Engineering and Manufacturing Development Phase is 
selected, and the design concepts should be relatively firm 
5. Phase II 
Milestone IT is the approval Milestone by the DAB to enter the Engineeling and 
Manufacturing Development phase of a new system. Of crucial importance at the 
Milestone TI review is the assessment that "the technologies and processes critical to 
success arc attainable." The DAB is additionally charged with a "rigorous" assessment of 
the costs of the system_ Prior to approval to enter EMD it should be demonstrated 
through testing that the system meets contract specification requirements, and operational 
requirements 
The focus during EMD is on the producibility orthe system. The A-12 contract for 
EMD was awarded to the team ofMcDonneU Douglas and General Dynamics in January 
1988, four years after initial concept studies had begun. The contractor team proposed an 
aggressive development schedule that would result in first flight thirty months after 
contract award 
6. Phase ill 
Phase Ul is the production of the actual system Milestone III is a critical 
milestone in a program's lifecyc1e_ Milestone III is the Production Approval for the 
system. The objectives as defined in DoD 5000.2 are to: (I) determine if the results of 
Phase IT warrant C()ntinuation, and (2) establish a Production Baseline containing refined 
program cost, schedule and performance objectives_ [Ref 7] Phase III is normally divided 
into two unofficial suh-phases: Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) and Full Rate 
Production. The purpose ofLR1P is to reduce the risk of producing the system by 
producing it in small quantities initially, then once the producibilily is verified, to hegin 
Full Rate Production 
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7 •. Phase TV 
Phase IV usually completes the acquisition lifccycle Phase IV is initiated hy 
Milestone IV, Major Modification ApprovaL The purpose orthe decision at r-.1ilcstone IV 
is to detclTIune if a major modification is required. In addition to major modifications, 
Phase IV includes the operations and support ufthe fielded equipment 
C. COST AND SCHEDULE CONTROL SYSTEMS CRITERIA 
1. Oven/ie",,' 
Throughout the acquisition process the cost of the proposed system is of greal 
importance. Cost must be considered at each milestone dc(;ision, All ACAT ID programs 
must inCOrpOrate CIS esc into the management of the program. Cost and schedule 
control systems allow program managers to track expenditures of reSOUfces in the 
program 
2. Requirements 
DoD 5000.2 requires that the contractor submit CIS esc information on all 
significant contracts that are not finn fixed-price. The definit ion of a significant contract 
for the requirement is a contral.i with Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 
(RDT&E) values of $60 miUion Of more, and procurement contracts valued at $250 
million or more, in fiscal year 1990 constant dollars. Contracts that are not determined to 
be significam must submit the CostlSchedule Status Report (CIS SR). [Ref 7] 
According to DoD 5000.2, the purposes of CIS CSC requirements are to : (1 ) 
provide uniform evaluation criteria to ensure contractor cost and schedule management 
systems are adequate, (2) to provide an adequate basis for responsible decision making by 
contractor management and DoD personnel, and (3) to bring to the attention of 000 
contractors, and encourage them to accept and install , management control systems and 
prrn;cdures that are most eITective in meeting requirements and controlling contract 
performance. [Ref 7] 
Contractors rcport CIS esc data monthly. DoD 5000.2 requires that 3 elements 
must be reponed: (I) comparison of budgeted cost for work scheduled and the budgeted 
cost of work perfonned; (2) comparison of the budgeted cost of work perfonned and the 
actual cost of work performed; (3) variances resulting from the diHerences in comparisons 
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between budgeted cost ofwark schedule and performed, and variances between budgeted 
cost of work performed and actual cost ofwark performed. [Ref. 71 
Of particular interest to program managers and DoD oversight personnel are the 
latest revised estimates (LRE) and estimates at completion (EAC) that are reported. The 
computation of these estimates may vary but there are four standard techniques that are 
explained later 
3, Purpose or CIS CSC 
CIS CSC are a management tool for monitoring actual progress on a contract 
versus the baseline. CIS CSC begins with the formulation of a work breakdown structure 
(WBS) that identifies the tasks and sub-tasks that constitute the complete work package 
of the contract. The WBS identifies which particular tasks may be ahead or behind 
schooule and identifies area.<; where the reallocation of resources is required. The tasks 
and sub-tasks are provided parallel work package budgets that are traceable to the work 
heing accomplished 
fhere are several methods of allocating valoe. One method is when work package 
budgets are time phased; no dollars are credited to a work package not startoo. Once a 
work package is started, 50 percent of the designated budget is credited to the package, 
while the remaining 50 percent is credited at completion. An alternative means of 
allocating earned value is to assign 100 percent of the value of the work package only 
when it is completed. Some distortion will be experienced in the actual progress ofthe 
contract using either of these methods 
The exact accounting system that a contractor must use to maintain CIS CSC data 
is not spccified by the Government. A system that provides the required data does nOI 
need to be modified to meet contractual requirements 
4. CIS esc Elements 
Contractors submit the Cost Perfonnance Report (CPR), which includes the CIS 
CSC data, to Ihe program manager . . For ACAT ill programs, program managers forward 
CPR infonnation with the Defense ACtjuisition Executive Summary (DAES) Report to the 
OUSD (A&T). Within the OUSD (A&T) office a datahase is maintained ofDAES CPR 
information In this research, the following elements of the CPR are of importance 
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a. Budgeted Cost of Work Schedulcd (DeWS) 
The BCWS is the dollar amount in current dollars budgeted to accomplish 
a specified work package in a specified time 
h. Budgt:ted Cost of Work Performed (8 CWP) 
The 8CWP is the cumulative dollar amount of the sum of the completed 
work and the open work packages. The BCWP is the baseline item in cost reports, It 
represents what portion of the work has been accomplished in dollars fRef 30). As used 
in this research, the BCWP is the cumulative dollar amount of the projected costs of the 
work scheduled at a specified completion point. BCWP information is drawn from the 
DAES database 
c. Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) 
ACWP is the actual co~ts incurred and recorded in accomplishing the work 
perfooned within a specified time period [Ref. 6] . As used in this research ACWP is the 
cumulative dollar amount of the actual costs for the work accomplished at a percentage 
completion point of the program ACWP information is drawn from the DAES database 
d. Budgt:t at Completion (BAC) 
The BAC is the dollar amount of the contract in teons of the cumulative 
cost of the BCWS, It is the contractually specified dollar amount 
c. Contract Budget Base (CBB) 
The CBB is the negotiated contract cost plus estimates of authorized but 
unpriced work. The CBB includes Management Reserve, which is money reserved for 
within-scope changes to the contract 
f. Esdmate at CODlpletioD (EAC) 
EAC is the contractor's estimate of the cumulative cost at completion of 
the sum of all work packages. EAC in its simplest form is the dollar amount of all costs 
incurred to date plus the dollar amowlt of all costs remaining to complete the contract 
The EAC may be derived by 
EAC = ACWP + (BAC - 8CWP) (2 1) 
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g. Cost Variance (CV) 
The CV is the difference hetween the dollar amount that was plalllled for 
the work package and the actual cost for the accomplished work package. It is 
determined hy 
CV == BCWP - ACWP (22) 
h. Percent Cost Variance 
The percent cost variance is a convenient means of comparing the 
magnitudes of differences between budgeted costs and actual costs. This research uses it 
as a comparison between different programs of varying budgets and schedules. It is a 
useful analysis tool and is given hy: 
% CV = CVIBCWP (2.3) 
i. Cost Perfonnance Index. Efficiency (CPI (E» 
The CPI (E) measures the efficiency with which work has been 
accomplished by comparing the ratio of the budgeted cost of work performed to the at-1ual 
It is given by 
CPI (E) = BCWPI ACWP (24) 
j. Cost Perfomlancr Index, Performance (CPI (P» 
The CPI (P) is simply the inverse of the CPI (E). This measures the actual 
cost of each plalllled dollar of work accomplished. It is given by: 
CPI (P) = ACWP/BCWP (2.5) 
5. Estimates at Completion 
The estimate at completion (EAC) can be derived a number of ways Some oflhe 
more common methods involve using an efficiency index of past work performed and 
extrapolating this into the future to dl-'1ennine the final cost of the project. The Cost 
Performance Index (CPI) is a commonly used tool to estimate the final cost Three 
methods for obtaining CPI estimates for completion costs are: 
a. Cumulative CPI (CPIcum) 
The EAC (CPlcum) is given by 
EAC (CPlcum) = DAC/CPI(E) 
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(26) 
This EAC uses tne cumulative budgeted costs to date and the cumulative acttlal 
costs to date to derive an efficiency of work index. The assumption is the efficiency index 
derive<! will remain stable into tne future, Gary ChristIe and Wayne Abba examine<! over 
500 contracts from the UAES database and found that the Cumulative cpr will remain 
stable between 15 and &5 percent complete in a program. Christie and Abba's 
obser'.:ations were verified empirically by Heise [Ref 17] , Heise examined a sample of 
155 contracts from the DAES database and confirmed that the Cumulative CPI remains 
!>1able between 20 percent complete and 85 percent complete 
b. Weighted CPI 
This method of estimating the final cost of a contract is essentially the same 
formula as (2.6) above. 'fhe primary difference is the usc of more recent data in the CPI 
(E) divisor, Commonly used weigbtings include 3 and 6 month CPI measurements. It has 
been found that the Weighted cpr will tend to give a higher estimate at completion than 
the Cumulative CPt. Normally, a range of estimates will be given to the program manager 
by the cost analyst 
c. CPIISPI 
[he CPJJSP[ estimate at completion is given by 
EAC (CPI/SPI) "" BAC x L(CPI(P)lSPI(E)] (2 .7) 
The CPI/SPI estimate is based on a ratio of the cost of the work performed and tbe 
scheduled time of the work perfonned This approach balances the cost and schedule to 
determine the ending cost 
6. Cost Overruns 
Cost overruns are common in weapon system development programs A Rand 
Report [Ref. 10] found the average cost growth in the development phase was 25 percent, 
and the average cost growth in the production phase was 18 percent. The repon also 
found that overruns varied by Service. No single cause for the cost growth could be 
detennim."<l. Two variables that showed a strong correlation to COS! growth were program 
sile and program maturity. The smaller the program the greater the cost variance from 
the baseline, and the longer the program, the greater the cost variance. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the Rand reports findings 
19 
Program Type Cost Summary Cost 
Growth Growth 
Vehicles 1.77 Total RDT&E 1.25 
Aircraft 1.28 Procurement 1.18 
Electronics 1.24 
Munitions 1.22 Army Programs 1.35 
Missiles 1.17 USAF Programs 1.20 
Space Systems 1.16 Navy Programs 1.16 
Helicopters 1.13 
Table I Cost Growth by Type of Program. [Ref 10] 
Surprisingly, the Rand report found that vehicles experience the greatest cost 
growth. The Rand study adjusted the budgets for inflation. The report did not test for 
statistical difference between either the types of programs or Service. Measuring cost 
variances is a relatively straightforward procedure. Estimating costs at completion is more 
difficult The next section introduces a method that can provide estimates of the 
completion costs of a EMD program 
D. THE RAYLEIGH DISTRIBUTION METHOD 
I. Overview 
The acwracy of a cost estimate is critical to the use of any method as a tool 
Expenditures in developmental programs tend to follow a distinctive curve, otten referred 
to as the Rayleigh Curve. This curve can be used to model natural events such as the 
growth of biological systems. Developmental projects tend to pattern this same type of 
growth during the lilccyde of the project. There are natural build-ups and build-downs in 
the level of resources consumed 
Norden used this curve in Useful Tools for Project MWiagemen( to model the 
costs and resource use of software development. Abernethy found the curve could 
accurately model the cost expenditure pattern of weapon system programs Elrod 
examined the application ofthe curve in EMD programs using two different models and 
found that it fit. Lee, Hogue and Gallagher developed a technique using the Rayleigh 
Function to estimate Research and Development budget profiles Gallagher and Lee 
developed a technique based on the Rayleigh model to provide probabilities for the 
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estimate at completion. Substantial prior work has been acwmplished that indicates the 
Rayleigh Function models actual expenditures well 
Here the Rayleigh model is used to estimate the ending costs of the A-12 program, 
had it continued to completion in EMD figure 2 provides a graphical representation of 
the cumulative eXllCnditure curve that models developmental program expenditures 
Figure 2 Typical "S" Shaped Rayleigh Curve. [Ref 181 
2. Formulae 
Thc general fonn of the Rayleigh cumulative density function is given by 
F(t) = J-exp(-«e) (28) 
Where a is a timl."-scale parameter and t is the time period. [Ref 18] Equation 
(2 .8) is adapted for use in developmental programs in the following function : [Ref IS] 
V(t) = d[l-(exp(-fle)] (2.9) 
Where Vet) is the earned value at time t. d is a positive constant that is equal to 
the tolal budget of the project (D) divided by .97. [Ref 18] 
D = V(tf) = .97d (2.10) 
a is a constant that for EMD projects has been estimated to equal 
u =3.5/ef (2.11) 
With t f equal to the final time of the pruject. [Ref. 18] 
Often the fmal time of the project is not known with certainty If the time of peak 
rate of expenditures is known or estimatcd, then a can be estimated by: 
fl 1/(21',) (2.12) 
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Where tp is equal to the time of peak rate of expenditures. The time of peak rate 
of expenditures assumes added importance for programs such as aircraft or missiles which 
have scheduled first flight dates. It has been found that the peak rate of expenditure often 
occurs at the time of first flight. By taking the first derivative of equation (2.9) and setting 
it equal to zero, the time of peak expenditure rate, or first flight can be found . [Ref HI] 
V'(t) = 2atLexp(-at'')] (2.13) 
Algebraic manipulation of equation (2.9) yields a formula for estimating the costs 
at completion, given a current ACWP at a specified time: [Ref 18] 
d =[ V(t)/(1-exp(-ae))] (214) 
E. APPLICA TJON OF THE RA YLEJGlJ )<'UNCTJON TO THE A-12 PROGRAM 
L Overview 
Early in this research the author realized that an appropriate tool for estimating 
costs at completion was needed. While common methods for estimating costs at 
completion involve the use of efficiency indices,this method was found to be 
inappropriate for estimations of completion costs when the eBB is subjeL1 to future 
changes. The CPI technique is based on the current budget and its estimates will be biased 
in this regard. Thc Raylcigh technique provides an estimate for what the future 
completion cost will be independent of current budgets. 
2. Justification 
Abernethy's previous work demonstrated a high correlation in the model's ability 
to provide ACWP estimates, given the final cost. Ahernethy, concluded that while the 
Rayleigh function could effectively model ACWP, given final actual costs, it was not a 
good predictor of final costs [Ref 2]. The question then becomes is the Rayleigh method 
a better predictor of final cost than the CPI methods? 
The Rayleigh Function wa~ applied to a sample of 10 contracts using equation 
(2.14) to detcnninc ifthe cstimates at completion were closer than estimates using 
efficiency indices. An estimate at completion for each percentage completion point was 
computed using the Rayleigh Function, the Cumulative CPI, and a Weightcd CPI. Thc 
total variance from the actual estimate at completion and the Rayleigh estimate showed an 
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absolute difference much less than the two other methods, indicating a more accurate 
model 
Funher refining the model by iteratively adjusting the shape parameters and 
establishing time bracket parameters resulted in even less variance in the Rayleigh 
estimates. The Rayleigh technique was able to achieve results that were 300 percent 
better than the Weighted CPI method and 200 percent better than the Cumulative CPI 
method. Elrod varied the alpha value of the model to determine a best fit to the data. In 
tltis research the alpha value is fixed at .00035 and the power oft from equation (2.14) is 
allowed to vary. The alpha value is able to be fixed at 00035 by standardizing all 
contracts to the same time period. Tltis was accomplished by using percent comptL'Iion 
points instead of months. Therefore every contract's time period consists of I 00 and a 
remains constant at .00035 
To optimize the model to the data the alpha value can not be a constant. Tltis was 
adjusted for by allowing the constant power of2 for the power of (-at) to vary. In effect 
equation (2,14) becomes 
d '" [V(t)/( l -exp(--at'»)] (2.15) 
Equation (2.15) was used to estimate the final cost of the A- 12 Program This 
equation varies from the original Rayleigh function by the addition of the variable x, The 
basis of the estimating technique fl:mains equivelent to the Rayleigh ml'lhodology 
The constant power 2 was replaced by the variable x to allow the model to adjust 
based on the percentage completion the program had achieved. During the research 
hundreds of tests were conducted using the Rayleigh model and actual contr<K:t data. It 
WB-~ found that the Rayleigh model consistently overestimated the completion costs early 
in the program and late in the program. By tixing ct and allowing the power oft to vary 
according to the percentage complete a significantly more accurate mode! was obtained 
In the research the variable x was allowed to assume one often values corresponding to 
percentage complete brackets, The addition of this third variable to the function changes 
the essential characteristics of what is considered the Rayleigh modeL A full examination 
of the effects oftltis addit ion are outside the scope of this research 
Gallagher rctined the Rayleigh model using Multiple Model Adaptive Estimation 
(MNIAE) IRef 14 J to provide Dayesian statistical probabilities of outcomes for costs at 
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completion By refining the model in this method it provided cumulative probahilities of 
the Rayleigh produced completion costs, Gallagher's MMAE model is used in this 
research to provide cumulative prohabilities of occurrence of the EAC for the A-12 
program 
F. THE RETA DISTRIBUTION 
Information on cost variances was collected ii-om 58 developmental contracts. 
llased on the sample and the hypothesis to be tested. data from all 58 contracts were not 
used. The requirements that the data had to meet for each research question are contained 
in Chapter IV, Data 
The sample data did not approximate a nonnal distribution. In this research a cost 
overrun is considered a negative cost variance while a cost underrun is considered a 
positive cost variance. The distribution of these data was skewed to the left, with the 
mean close to zero and data points extending far into the left tail 
Using Best Fit lRef. 20], the distribution that was most representative of cost 
overruns was the Beta distribution. The Beta distribution can assume many shapes based 
on the two parameters (I', w) that determine its shape. Figure 3 is provided to give the 
reader some insight into the degree to which the lleta distribution modeled the data. More 
information on the distribution of the data is contained in Appendix B 
Comparison of Input Distribution and Beta(7 .65,2.39) * 
32.40 + -30.86 
D lepu;: 
• Beta 
Values in 10" 1 
Figure 3. The Beta Distribution 
24 
G. SllM"!\fARY 
This chapter provided an overview ofthe Acquisition Process and the CIS esc 
lenninoiogy that will be used throughout this paper 
The technique used for ohtaining EACs for the A-12 program was presented 
\Vhile there are endless teclmiques for estimating completion costs, the Rayleigh model is 
used hased on prior research and its ability to estimate costs independent of current 
budgets 
Cost variances are usually negative The distribution of cost variances tor the 
sample was skewed to the left_ Jhe Beta distrihution tended to model cost overruns better 
than the "'Ionnal distribution A graphical presentation oflhe Beta distribution is helpful in 
picturing the distribution of cost ovcnuns 
Chapter III completes the background portion of this paper. Chapter III examines 
the A-12 Program and the cost variances that caused the termination of the Program 
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1lI. TllE A-121'ROGRAM 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter is intended to give the reader background information on the Navy's 
A-12 development program. As shown in Chapter Il, cost overruns in defense 
acquisitions are not unusual. Tltis chapler supports Ihe primary research question by 
examining the A-12 Program and the cost overnills that occurred. For a more in-depth 
view afthe A-12 Program the reader i~ referred to The Beach Report [Ref 21 the Na ... y's 
internal review of the Program that was conducted in 1990 
8, MISS10N ~ED 
The A-12 Avenger was designed to replace the A-61ntruder in the 1\a'ry's carrier 
based fleet Its projected survivability and adaptability would allow the\la'.y to also 
replace the EA-uB, Advanced Tactical System aircraft. The Navy also considered the air-
to-air capability of the A-12 in possibly replacing the F-14~ in the Heet defense role. The 
various roles that the A-12 could fill would provide a more streamlined logistical system 
by reducing the various spare part~ that would be carried in inventory [Ref 21] The 
aircraO was to be a carrier -based medium range attack aircraft with low observable 
(~tealth) characteristics. The United States Air Force (USAF) was interested in procuring 
up to 400 A-12 variants that would not require the ~tmr..-tural hardening to land on aircraft 
carriers The Air Force's version was planned to be the replacement for the 1; Ill. The Air 
Force planned on taking initial delivery in 1995, [Ref 9] 
The first version of the A-6 entered the fleet in 1963 as an all weather, day/night 
medium attack aircraft The latest version ofthe A-6, the A-6P. , was introduced in 1972 
and procurement runtinued through 1987, In the 1980's wing cracb began appearing in 
the invenlory oflhe A-6s. The stress of lalldillg 011 caniers required thal when the wings 
reached 67 percent of their life, the plane was limited to restricted duty until the wings 
were replaced, By 1988, mOSI oflhe invelllory of A-6s was rapidly degrading. III 1988, 
the year the contrar.., for the Full-Scale Development of the 1\-12 was awarded, the Navy 
placed its last production order for the A-G. The A-12, with an Initial Operational 
Capability (Joe) of 1994, was to replace the A-6s The firM squadron was projected 10 he 
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combat ready by late 1996 [Ref 211_ Figure 4 shows the projected A-12 aircraft 
superimposed over the F-14 and the A-6 
Figure 4. Aircraft Comparison_ [Ref 21] 
C. EARLY DEVEL.OPMENTAL WORK 
In 1984 Concept Exploration work began on the A-1 2 Program The f -1 17 
Stealth Fighter proved the validity of stealth technology. The F-117 was operational for 
one year with the USAF in the Nevada Desert, however, it was still tightly classified. The 
early development work on the A-12 was also classified as a special access program 
In 1984, two separate contractor teams began concept exploration for the new 
aircraft. This PrOl;,'Tam was initiated in 1984 with the start of Concept Exploration. In 
June 1986 the same contractor teams were awarded contracts to continue work into 
Demonstration and Validation. In June 1986, Captain Lawrence Elberfeld was appointed 
as the Program Manager of the Program wbich was now in Phase I of the Acquisition 
Process. Captain Elberfeld participated in the source selection for the A-12 Phases 0 and 
I of the aUjuisition cost $28 billion. [Ref. 25] 
D. FULL--SCALE DEVELOPMENT 
I. The Contract 
Tbe FSD contraci was awarded to McDonnell Douglas/General Dynamics in 
January 1988 The contract was a Fixed-Price-Incentive-Firm type contract with a share 
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ratio of 60/40 above contract target cost. The target price was $4.379 billion, the target 
cost was $3.981 billion and the ceiling price was 54.77 billion [Ref 9]. On any ovenuns 
above target cost, from $4.4 billion to $4,8 billion, the Government would pay 60 cents of 
every dollar and the contractor would pay 40 cents. The Point of Total Assumption was 
$4.65 billion, Progress payments to the contractor were approved at the 80 percent rate 
The contract required the full-scale development and prototype production of the 
aircraft , The original first flight was scheduled for June 1990. This date was adjusted 
several times throughout contract performance, until just prior to termination the 
projected first flight dale was March 1991, The time offirst flight in an aircraft 
development contract is of crucial importance in estimating cost expenditures. As was 
explained in ChaptCf II in more detail, the point of first flight is usually the point of peak 
expenditures of the program. Given this point the total cost of the contract at completion 
may be estimated. Historical data indicate that 40 percent of the development costs are 
expended at the point oftirst flight [Ref 14]. The impact of delaying the first flight results 
in increased cost and extended development schedule [Ref 181. Table 2 provides the 
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Table 2, A-12 First flight Adjustments 
The contract also required delivery of "eight flight test aircraft and five fuU-scale 
ground test articles. ,, " Additional provisions of the contract provided for three production 
opt ion lots of 4, 6, and 16 aircraft, and an option for a fourth production lot at the 
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completion of the Critical Design Review. The first two production lots were for pilot 
production and the third and fourth lots were low rate initial production. [Ref. 91 
2. Costs 
Initial cost estimates were based on the purchase of858 total aircraft at an annual 
procurement rate of 48 aircraft. With the reduction of the fleet to 14 aircraft carriers the 
requirement for A-12s dropped to 620 aircraft purchased at an annual rate of36. 
The cost of the A-12 was initially projected to be $86.6 million per aircraft, given a 
production rate of 48 per year. When the requirement dropped to 36 aircraft per year, the 
cost per aircraft increased to over S I 00 million per aircraft. The Lot T pilot production 
was priced at $1 .2 billion for 6 aircraft [Ref. 24] . As production continued and the 
quantity produced increased with the anticipated USAF demand, prices were expected to 
fall, according to Learning Curve theory 
A graphical cost comparison of the A- 12 to other combat aircraft is shown in 
Figure 5. Costs shown are adjusted to 1995 dollars using Department of the Na"y 
inflators All data are drawn from U.S. Weapon Systems Costs [Ref. 5]. 
Figure 5. A-12 Cost Comparison. [Ref. 5] 
The cost data presented are from 1975 to 1995, and adjusted to 1995 constant 
dollars using Department of the Nary inflator values. As shown, the cost ofth~ A-12 
would have been significantly higher than other aircraft in the inventory The cost data for 
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the f-117 are still restricted, so no comparison can be made to other stealth fighter 
aircraft 
3. Costs at Completion 
Thc decision to tenninate the A- 12 Program was based on the oost overruns that 
the Program was e:<pcriencing and the uncertain estimate of costs at oompletion. The 
Secretary of Defense stated that the inability of being able to detcrmine thl! final cost of 
the Program was a primary reason for the termination 
The cost at oompletion is driven by the first flight date. As the programmcd first 
flight of the aircraft is c:<tendcd, total program time is c:<tended and the costs increase 
The difficulty of determining a final cost is highlighted in Table 3 Table 3 provides final 
cost estimates of the Program determined by the Department of Defense Inspector 
Gencral (DoD IG) 
Table 3 000 IG Estimates at Completion. lRef 9] 
The DoD IG estimates were prepared by the Cost Analysis Improvement Group 
(CAIG). The eNG estimates provide EACs based on three possible first flight dates and 
three possible percentage completion points. The June 1991 first flight date is the most 
optimistic date. The range of values is ba~cd on assumptions orthe percentage of the 
programs that would be complete at first flight, with 60 percent being the most optimistic. 
4. The Contractors 
The solicitation for the A-12 required a teaming arrangement. A teaming 
arrangement is intended to provide two qualiiied contractors for production to reduce unit 
costs. When the FSD phase of the A-12 contract began 10 USC 2438 required the 
Department of Dt.>fense to establish at lcast two compctitive sources for production This 
law was later amended in November of 1990. [Ref. 231 
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The purpose of a teaming arrangement is to avoid reliance on a sole source of 
production for the system, Each contractor is to provide his particular area of expertise 
for the program and have the capability to independently produce the system after 
developmcnt. In the A-12 Program, the contractors established a written agreement that 
provided each team member would try to convince the Navy to guarantee a minimum of 
40 percent of the production to cach tcam member. Whcn the requirement for the A-Us 
was reduced to 620 ai rcraft a competitivc production contmt-1: was not feasible . 
According to a General Accounting Office (GAO) report issued in 1992, " ... an 
award split other than 50-50 or 60-40 would have put the losing contra(..1:or out ofthe 
A-12 business." l Ref 23 : p. 7] 
The larger member orthe A-12 tcam, McDonnell Douglas, was created in 1967 
with the acqui!>ition of the financially troubled Douglas Aircraft Company by McDonncli 
Company. McDonnell Douglas has been the ~ation's top prime contractor in all but one 
of the years from 1984 to 1994 [Rcf 8] . Its averagc share ofthe Uepartment of Defense's 
prime contracts has averaged around 6 percent of the value of total contracts awarded. 
According to Financial World magazine McDonnell Douglas has a market value of$5.6 
billion, 154th in value of all U.S . companies, In 1994 McDonnell Douglas had $J] ,) 
billion in sales and $562 million in profits [Ref. 13] 
McDonnell Douglas produces the F-J 5 Eagle, f-18 Hornel, C-17 Globemaster ill, 
AV-8 Harrier, T-45 Goshawk, AH-64 Apache, and the Tomahawk and Harpoon missiles 
It also has RDT&E contracts for electronics and communications equipment, along with 
missile and space systems. [Ref 5 J 
The other member of the A-12 team, General Dynamics, has consistcntly been in 
the top ten Defense contractors for the past ten years. Its dollar value of prime contracts 
has ranged from $2 billion to $8 billion, Its market value is $2.75 billion, placing it at 
number 329 of the nation's top companies In 1994 it had $3 billion in sales and $214 
million in profits. [Ref. 13] 
General Dynamics produces the F-16 falcon, the Seawolfnuclear submarine, M-\ 
tank, Tomahawk missile, Stinger missile, RlM-66 missile and the MK~ 15 Close in Weapon 
System, [Rcf 5] 
J2 
Bolh companitls have a history oflitigation actions with the Government They 
currently arc conte~ting the $1 .35 billion ill unliquidaled progress payments demanded by 
the Government and they have a certified claim for equitable adjustment for $14 billion 
resulting from the tenninalion uflhe A-12 Program [Ref 28, July 27 \ 994]. A ruling in 
December 1994 that vacated the Department of Defense's Termination for Default was 
considered a vi("101)' by the contractors in their efforts to clear their financial debt to the 
Government on the 1\-12 Program 
E. TERMINATION 
The 1\-12 Program was tenninated for default on 7 January 1991 The Secretary 
of Defense directed the Navy to terminate the trouhled Program. Although many reasons 
contributed to the termination of the Program, this research is primarily concerned with 
the stated reason for termination: cost overruns. The estimate at completion for the A-12 
varied significantly. The Secretary of Defense stated uncertainty in estimating the cost of 
the contract was the primary reason for tenninating the Program 
This program t:allllot be sustained unless I ask Congress for more 
money and bail the contrat.1ors out, but I have made the decision that I will 
not do that. No one can tell me exactly how much more money it will cost 
to keep this program going. ] do not believe a bailout is in the national 
interest. ]fwe cannot spend thc taxpayers' money wisely, we will not 
spend it. [Ref. 22: p. 3] 
2. Costs at Tennination 
rhe cost of the work at:complished in the A- 12 Program is difficult to estimate 
at:wrately. Under a fixed-price type wntract the contractor is required to provide a 
deliverable to the Government The Govemment will pay for the products or services it 
has accepted 
In the A-1 2 Program, the value of the work accomplished was priced at S \ .34 
billion. The contractors had incurred much greater costs in the development of the 
aircraft. Table 4 provides a detailed accounting of work accepted by the Government at 
tennination 
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~I::i: Design Review Preliminary De5ign Review Cntieal Design Review (Engine) Critical Design Rev~ew(Phase IA) 
Phase 1A Test Review . 





Table 4 Value of Work Accepted. [Ref. 26J 
While the value of work accepted was priced at $1.33 billion, the actual price paid 
for the work was $2.69 billion. Of this $2.69 billion the Government has demanded 
$1 .352 billion in unliquidated progress payments be returned. The contractors are 
currently disputing the decision of the Government of the value of work a(;ccpted. (Ref. 
25] 
Total expenditures on the A-12 Program exceeded the value of the work at.:ceptcd 
at telTIlination. Table 5 provides a listing of expenditures on the A~ 12 Program at the 
point of tennination 
,-~~~------------~$~------, 
TotaIAp~QPliati:on$ 
Total RDT&E Expenditures 
f~ Contract £xpendilure~ 
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Table 5. A- 12 Program Expenditures. [Ref. 26] 
3. Contractor Claims 
The contractors have an immense financial interest in the favorable seUiemenl of 
the litigation. The conversion of the telTIlination, from default to convenience, would 
completely restructure the settlement amounts. 
The contractor learn has filet! a daim for equitable adjustment of S 1.4 billion The 
contractors claimed that the contract could not be eompletet! according to the 
contrat.:tually specilied terms bc(;ausc of: 
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I The Na\)"s superior knowledge of facts vital to perfonnance 
2 Ddays and disruptions caused by the Navy's conduct 
The Navy's flawed acquisition strategy 
Commercial impossibility of perfonnance 
Thc $1 .35 billion demanded by the Government has been deferred pending thc 
outcome urlhe litigation. [Ref. 25J 
F. TIlE JOINT ADVANCEI) STRIKE TECHNOLOGY PROGRAM 
I. Onrview 
The Navy committed seven years and S2.985 billion to the A-12 Program If the 
contractors arc successful in their litigation the cost ofthc A-12 Program to the 
GOvCTlUllcnt could go as high as $6 billion. Allhe termination ufthe Program the Navy 
had very little that it could usc in a future dt.wclopmcnt program. During hearings by the 
Committee on Armed ScrviC{:s of the House of Representatives on the A-12 termination, 
Congressman Sisisky called the tennination of the A-12 Program" a national di~ter 
with naval aviation. H 
2. The Nelt Fighter 
The cost ofdcvcloping a fighter aircraft to fulfill just the Navy's needs is 
prohibitively expensive. A joint program with the Air Force is currently ongoing called 
the Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program (JAST) 
rhe JAST aircraft is being designed as a low observable technology aircraft that is 
projected to replace the Navy's A-6, the USAFs F-16 and the Mannes AV-8, While the 
JAST aircraft will not have the ordinance carrying capacity that was provided by the A-6, 
this shortcoming is expected to be made up for in its use of smart weapons and increased 
survivability 
The lAST Program started in 1994 and is currently in Phase 0 of the acquisition 
process. It is expccted to stan EMD in the year 2000, Low Rate Initial Production 
( LRlP) in 2005, and Initial Operational Capability by the year 2007. [Ref \6] 
The total cost (life cycle cost) of the Program is expected to range from $160 to 
$200 biUion. Unit procurement costs are expected to be from S30 to $40 million. This 
figure is relatively inexpensive when compared to the cost of other currently operational 
combat aircraft (See Figure 5) 
35 
The JAST aircraft is being conceived of as a modular aircraft that will utilize a 
common fuselage and Service unique components would then be added on. According to 
the Program Office, 85 percent commonality of parts is the goal. [Ref 16] 
The Mission Need Statement and the Operational Requirements Document from 
the A-12 Program were used as the base for developing the l\.1NS and ORD for the JAST 
Program. The Program Manager is an 0-7 The duties of Program Manager wi ll rotate 
between the USAF and the Navy, [Ref 16] 
G, SUMMARY 
Chapter Ul providcrl a short summary of the A~ 12 Proh'fam The Program 
generally followed the basic Acquisition Process outlined in Chapter n. Although the 
A-12 was a restricted access program it was still subject to oversight. Shortly after the 
stan of the FSD contract the Program started incurring cost overruns. As the Program 
continued the overruns became worse. The uncertainty in the estimates of final 
completion costs resulted in the termination ofthc Program 
Chapter IV presents comparison data of other EMD programs and cost variances 
These data are used to contrast the A-12 cost variances and determine if the A-12's 




This chapter provides the data that arc used to answer the primary research 
question: Was the A-12 Program over cost when compared to other similar acquisitions'l 
Chapter IV begins by providing the actual reported cost data tor the A-12 Program up to 
the point of contract tennination. Data from 58 comparison contracts are then provided 
as the sample to be tested against 
J'herc are hundreds of contracts in the DAES database. The selection of the 
contracts used in this research confonned to the requirements set OUI in Chapter I, with a 
few exceptions. SixLy-five EMD contracts were initial!y drawn from the database. Seven 
COlllracts were eliminated from the sample due to excessive rcbasclining or insufficient 
data points_ Three contracts were retained that did not meet the ten data point 
requirement. These contracts were for aircraft development and met the uther specified 
requirements for inclusion 
It became apparent, as this research was conducted, that all programs experience 
adjustments to the Contract Budget BaSI;! (CBB). In the 58 contracts examined for 
comparison with the A-12 Program only two contracts showed a downward adjustment in 
the CBB. In one case the program's funding was reduced hy nearly half, the other 
contract showed a cost at completion that was just slightly under the original estimate 
rhe effects of inflation do not account for thl;! upward revisions. Contractor 
expenditure hudgets are hased on future predictions uf price escalation. This was 
confimled hy a former program manager of Lockheed Corporation and a Cost Analyst 
",,'Ih the CA1G. The explanations lor the adjustments to the CBB can include poor 
original understanding of the scope of work, or adjustments to the contractual 
requirements. Regardless of the cause, only five of the 58 contracts examined finished the 
EMD phase within five percent of the original CBB 
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B. A-12 PROGRAM COST DATA 
1. Program Information 
The A-12 Program began the EMD phase in January 1988 Significant effort on 
the Program was expected to be complete by April 1996, with first flight of a prototype 
aircraft in June 1990, During the life of the A-12 Program, 27 Cost Penonnance Reports 
and nine Selected Acquisition Reports (SAR) were submitted. The data from the A-12 
Program will be compared to the sample 58 contracts to detennine if the A-12 cost 
variances were within the population of cost variances 
fhe comparison between the A-12 cost variances and the sample is based on cost 
variance at several percentage completion points Table 6 provides the reported A-12 cost 
infonnation 
~;~~~~ ____ ~~ ____ ~~ ______ ~,:.~. ____ ~c~~'~~'~re~ __ ~~ 
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!'able 6. A-12 Reported Cost Infonnation 
The A- 12 cost data are drawn from the nine submitted Selected Acquisition 
Repons, The percent complete and the percent cost variance are as reponed. The 
Program was tenninated in January 1991 , The accur4cy of the reported cost data is of 
great importance in determining whether the A- 12 Program differed significantly from 
other siarilar programs 
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2. Accuracy of Reported Cost Data 
rhe accuracy of the A-12 ACWP data can be affected by numerous factors There 
is delay from the time work has occurred to when it is reported. There can also be 
material understatements oflhe actual cost uflhe work perfonned 
During the EtwID phase oflhe A-12 Program, McDonnell Douglas was 
experiencing cash flow problems [Ref. 15]. Significant cost variances reduce the amount 
oflhe progress payments based on estimatt!s at completion. A reduction in the amount of 
the progress payments made to Md)onnell Douglas would have had a negative financial 
impact in what was already a poor financial climate fur the contractor, incentives exist to 
under report cost infonnation on an over-budget program, or to shift costs from an 
over-budget program to a within-budget program 
Evidence of McDonnell Douglas shifting costs fl·om the A-12 Program to other 
Government contracts was reponed in the September I I, 1995 edition of the Wall Street 
Journal. According to the article, the U.S. Justice Department has decided to litigate a 
whistle blower case. It is alleged, " .. _company super-,:isors systematically ordered 
assembly-line employees to improperly shift untold millions of dollars oflabor costs 
between valious weapons programs, including the C-17 cargo plane, F-18 fighters and the 
Navy's now-cancelled A-1 2 carrier based stealthy attack jet , ,. The article further states 
that the C- 17 and the A- 12 were "the biggest beneficiaries of the alleged cost shifting" 
The amount of money involved is in the hundreds of millions 01" dollars, [Ref 28, II Sept 
1?95] 
No correction can empirically be made to the actual reponed costs for the 
Program. lflhe ACWP figures have been understated it can not be shown within the 
bounds of this research, and the impact it may have had on the Program is also out of the 
scope. An assumption is made that cost shifting may occur in any given program and no 
adjustment is made to the data 
3. The Problem of Rebaselilling 
The percentages complete ofthe A-12 Program as shO'wn in Table 6 is based on a 
Contract Budget Base 01"$) ,<)8 to $4.05 billion_ Since the contract would have exceeded 
the ceiling price 01"$4,7 billion the Program would have been rebaselined il" il had 
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continued to completion. No significant adjustments were made to the CBB in the A-12 
Program, In all the comparison contracts some degree ofrebaselining occurred, in many 
cases the amount of the rebaseline was quite significant. Table 7 shows the average 
percentage adjustments in the sample program's CBBs For contract information, the 
reader is referred to Appendix A. To determine the CBB adjustments a relatively large 
percentage of the program had to be complete, The percentage was detennined to bc data 
points covering at least 50 percent of the total program, and a program completion point 
achieved of at least 70 percent. The adjustment is determined by measuring the difference 
between the initial CBB and the ending CBB 
,------------------------------------------, 
CO<ilTYIJe 
Table 7 Contract Budget Base Adjustmcnts 
Adjustments to the eBB have two major affects on the reported cost information. 
First, the percentage completion is reduced based on the new budget. Second, the cost 
variance percentage changes, based on the new BCWP figures 
Both affects impact the ability to estimate final completion costs accurately 
Adjustments to the contract's budget can be made for a variety of reasons, The more 
stable the baseline, the more accurate the estimate at completion will be. 
Table 8 provides adjusted percentage oompletion points of the A-12 Program 







NoI~' FIgIlt~s"'e reported in mii lionS of C<)t)SW11 dollars 
Table 8 Rayleigh Model Estimates of A-12 Program Expenditures 
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The first time estimate is the contractually specified first flight and contract 
length The second and third estimates are base<! on estimates ofthe first flight date, at 
contract termination. The first flight dates were obtained from Reference 9. The first 
flight date, in months from program start, is multiplied by 2.65 [Ref. \8] to estimate the 
total program length. The estimates at completion were derived using the Rayleigh model 
methodology described in Chapter 11 The percentage complete at termination is 
determined by taking the termination cost of the A-12 and dividing it by the EAC. The 
EAC is based on an assumption of 40 percent of costs incurred at first flight 
4. The Estimate at Completion 
The accuracy of using the Rayleigh model to estimate cost at completion was 
tested by Elrod [Ref Ill. Elrod found a generally good fit between the Rayleigh model 
and actual costs at completion. Gallagher, a cost analyst in the Cm! Analysis 
Improvement Group (CAIG), further developed this technique rRef. 14] 
The Rayleigh model's predictive capahility was tested against ten aireraft program 
contracts. A comparison was then made using the CPlcum technique to detennine the 
more accurate predictor The results of this test are provided in a graph in Figure 6 
Percent Complete 
i-=-RaYleigh Estimate (Exponen_tial F~) 
~ __ 1~-~C=-P=I_E=,_'=m~"t="=(O=P=OO="O="='=Frt=)==~ ______ ~ 
Figure 6 Rayleigh Model Versus CPlcum 
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As shown in Figure 6, the Rayleigh estimates provide significantly less variance 
fi'om actual completion costs over the life of the program. To derive the curves in the 
graph, data points from all ten programs were plotted against time and an exponential 
curve was fit to the data. Gl:ncrally, past the 20 percent completion point, the Rayleigh 
model provides reasonable estimates of actual program completion costs. The percentage 
cost variances are within 10 percent of actual ending costs at the 40 percent completion 
point. Using the CPIcum technique, the estimates are not within 10 percent of actual 
ending costs until the 80 percent completion point. On the basis of Elrod and Gallagher's 
work, and the test against ten actual contracts, the Rayleigh model is accepted as 
providing a realistic estimate of A- 12 Program costs 
5. Likelihood of th~ Estimates 
An estimate of a future occurrence is by definition uncertain It is of interest to be 
able to say with what prohabiJity the outcome will occur. The estimates of the final cost 
of the A-12 Program in Table 8 were tested using a software program developed and 
provided by Gallagher [Ref. 14] to determine the likelihood that the ending cost estimate 
would occur. Gallagher's work uses past cost figures to develop a Bayesian probabiLity of 
future occurrence of the ending cost. He developed this technique while working as a cost 
estimator with the CAlG 
Three estimates at completion were tested using Gallagher's model. The first 
estimate was the Program Manager's EAC at contract termination. The second and thi rd 
estimates were the EACs produced by the Rayleigh model for first 11ight dates of June 
1992 and December 1992. Table 9 gives the probability that final ending costs would 
exceed the estimate For a detailed explanation of the development of the probabilities 
and the Rayleigh estimates, the reader is referred to Filial-Cost Estimates fur Research & 
Development Programs Conditioned on Realized Costs by Mark A. Gallagher and David 
A Lee [Ref. 14] . The article is available through the Defense Technical Information 
Center database 
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fable 9 Probability of Final Cost Estimates 
In Table 9, the cumulative probabilities of occurrence of the given cost estimate 
are provided. The first column, 1st Flight, presents two possible first flight dates. These 
dates are drawn from the CAIG estimates providetl to the 000 IG Columns two through 
four provide four possible EACs and the probabilities of the Program exceeding the given 
EAC. The first EAC is the original ceiling price of the contract. The probability that the 
Program would have exceeded this ceiling is almost certain lftirst flight would have 
OCCUlTed in December 1992, the probability that the Program cost would have exceeded 
$11 bi\1jon is.49 
To compute the probabilities shown in Table 9, two time assumptions are required 
For a first flight date of June 1992, the minimum Program length was assumed to be five 
years from initiation with the maximum length of 13 years. If the first flight would have 
OCCUlTed in December of ! 992, then the minimum length was assumed to be eight years 
with a maximum length of 15 years 
C. COMPARISO N CONTRACT COST DATA 
1. The Comparison Sample 
Over 100 contracts were examined from the DAES database for inclusion into the 
sample. Sixty-five contracts were initially found to meet the requirements as specified in 
Chapter I: at least ten data points existed, the program had achieved a significant level of 
completion, and the program was classified as an ACAT ill program. Of the 65 COntHlcts 
selected for comparison, five were eliminated due to non-consistency in completion 
percentages and two contracts were eliminated due to insufficient data 
2. Chanu~teristi(S of t ile Sa mple 
Fifty-eight contracts constitute the sample. To be included in the DAES database 
the program must be an ACAT ill program. All the contracts examined were for major 
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programs '['he completion points of the sample ranged from a low of 40 percent complete 
to a high of 100 percent complete. The average completion point achieved by the 58 
sample contracts was 83 percent complete Table 10 shows the characteristics oflhe 
sample examined 





rable 10. Characteristics of the Sample 
The cost variances of the sample were determined using equation (2.3) All 
contracts that met the specified criteria in Chapter T were used. Not all the sample 
contracts had data points for each of the percemage completion points. For those 
contracts that had mUltiple data points within a percentage completion range, the cost 
variances were averaged to avoid weighting data from anyone comract more than other 
contracts 
The data for the percentage completion brackets are each modeled seperately 
Only the 0 to 10 percentage completion bracket exhibits the Nomlal distribution that one 
would expect if cost variances were distributed about a mean cost variance of zero 
Table II provides the cost variances observed in the sample contracts, In Table 
11, the completion point refers to the percentage complete the program has achieve<! 
measured by time expended divided by total time. Column 2 gives the arithmetic mean of 
the sample. The data are skewed to the left. The median is provided as a reference point 
The sample of all 58 contracts is modeled by the Beta distribution Column 4 indicates the 




Table 11. Cost Variances of Sample Contracts 
4. Aircraft Program Data 
Seventeen contracts were included in the aircratl cost variance sample. Three 
contracts for aircraft developmental work were included in the sample that had only nine 
data points To be included in the sample the program had to show relatively increasing 
degrees of completion as work progressed. The aircraft program contracts consisted of 
the contract for the program itself or for major aircraft type subassemblies. Contracts for 
subassemblies such as avionics, engines Of annamcnts were not considered. Contracts for 
follow-on developmental work were also not included . Helicopters were considered as 
aircraft 
Of the 19 contracts initially examined only one program was terminated. The 
remaining programs continued into production or are still in the EMD phase_ Tht': ont': 
program that was terminated was later restarted under a different designation. This 
contract was not considered for inclusion since many of the technical problems that caused 
the original termination would have been paid for and would not have shown up in the 
new ACWP figures Table 12 provides the mean and median cost variances ofEMD 
aircraft programs. 
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Table 12 Aircraft Program Cost Variances 
The mean cost variance for all aircraft programs examined was -18.4 percent The 
median value was -6. 13 percent. Seventeen programs were included in the sample 
5. Fi:led-Pric~ Versus CoS(w Typ~ Contracts 
All contracts that had exceeded 50 percent complete were included in the sample 
The mean cost variance for aU programs examined was -16.5 percent. Table 13 provides 




CONTRACT CV % 
FP _2102% -10 2% 15 
COST -14 76% ~ 05% 
TOTAL 165% .a: 78% 
Note Total-Most Iccent cv for contracts'> 50% complete 
Table 13 Fixed-Price Versus Cost-Type Contract Cost Variances 
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n. SUMMARY 
rhis chapter presented the data to be used in Chapter V to determine jflhe A-12 
Program was significantly different from other EMD programs The diflicuhy of 
developing accurate estimates at completion is caused by several factors such as 
rebasclining, changes, or extensions of program length , The m<:an cost variance ofEMD 
programs is -16.5 percent with a median value of -6.78 percent. While the median value 
for cost variances docs not appear to be too signjficant, the true cost variances are masked 
by adjustments to the CBtl. The mean adjustment to the eBB is 54 percent with a median 
value of 46 percent 
Adjustments to the eBB and cost variances are evaluated in Chapter y, Chapter 
V tests the hypothesis that the A- 12 Program cost variances W!;;fC no greater than olher 
EMD programs. The next chaptL'r also examines secondary causes for thc termination of 
the A- 12 Program 
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V. DATA ANALYSIS 
A. OVERVIEW 
Chapter IV presented the data from 58 separate EMD contracts. Chapter V 
establishes percentile values for the sample programs and compares the A-!2 Program 
cost variances Initially, the /\-12 is cumpared to the entire sample for differences The 
A-12 cost variances are then compared to other aircraft programs 
B. A-12 COST VARIANCES 
1. Percentile Values 
1'0 provide a valid comparison orlhe sample data and the A-12 CO~1 variances, the 
cost variances arlhe sample are grouped by percentage completion points. Percentile 
values arc detennin~ for each sample point based on the type of distribution. The 
procedure to accomplish this was to use the statistical software program, Minitab [Ref. 
19]. The Inverse CDF command returns the percentile value for the specified point. With 
the Beta distribution the critical value is a value from 0 to 1. This value is conven ed to 
the actual value using techniques described in Appendix D. Table 14 provides the 





CHI Uth 9tt1t 
PARAM PAflAM sao PERCENnLE PERCENTILE 
1 2 VALUE 
Table 14 Percentile Values for the Sample Contracts 
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The data from Table 14 are used to answer the primary research question and 
Hypothesis I: Point values of the A-12 are no different from cost variances of the sample 
The first column of the Table provides the percentage completion points of the sample 
contracts, Column 2 provides the distribution that best modeled the data, the resulting 
Chi-squared value is in Column 5. The parameters associated with the distribution are in 
Columns 3 and 4. For the Nonnal distribution, the parameters are given by the mean and 
standard deviation. The percentile values are the area of the distribution above the given 
value 
2. A-12 Cost Variance Percentiles. 
After detennining the critical values in Table 14, the next step was to evaluate 
where the A-12 C()st variances were in relation to the distribution. Table 15 provides the 
comparison of A-12 C()st variances versus the sample. 
AR'" 
% % TYPE ABOVE 
COMPLETE CV OI$TRO VALUE 
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Table IS. A- 12 Cost Variance Percentile Values 
The H~"ulls fTOm Table 15 agree with prior work by Heise rRef i8J, Christensen 
[Ref. 3J , and observations made by Abba and ChristIe As the program prot:ccds the cost 
ovemln does not improve 
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In Table IS, Columns I and 2 are Ihe percentage completion points and cost 
variance as reported. The distribution that modeh:d the data is in Column 3. The final 
Column provides the percentage of programs that the A-12 cost variance exceeded 
The A-12 cost variances exceeded 75 percent of sample programs at the 7,6 
percent completion point. The cost variances worsened from that point on. Given Heise's 
earlier findings that the CPIcum wi!! remain stable from the 20 percent completion point 
on, it is unlikely that the cost variances of the A-12 woold have improved, if the program 
had continued. The relation of the A-l2's cost varianees to other programs did not 
improve. At termination the cost variance of the A-12 exceeded 97 percent of all other 
programs. As shown from the sample data, the A-12 cost ovenuns were exceptional 
c. AmCRAFT PROGRAMS 
1. Aircraft Program Percentile Values 
in Table 16, aircraft progr.un cost variances are examined to determine if A-12 
cost variances differed from other aircraft programs The same analysis techniques were 
used as with the comparison to the overall sample 
CHI 95tt1 
'Y. TYPE PARAM PARAM SQD PERCENTILE PERCENTILE 
COMPLETE DlSTRO 1 2 VALUE VALUE VALUE 
20 .51 
Table 16. Aircraft Program Percentile Values 
The sample of aircraft programs includes 17 separate contra<."ts Cost variances 
are determined tor each percentage completion bracket The data are modeled using 
llestFit [Ref. 20] . Appendix B contains complete information on rankings and selection of 
distribution types. Percentile values were determined using J\.tjnitab 
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2. The A-12 Progr-dm Versus Sample Aircraft Programs 
The reported A-12 cost variances and percentage completion points were 
compared to other aircraft programs to determine differences. The results are provided in 
Table 17 
AR<A 
'1. '1. TYPE ABOVE 





Table 17. A-12 Versus Sample Aircraft Programs 
The distribution that best modeled the data from the aircraft programs was used to 
compute the area under the cumulative density function (COr) for the A-12 values. This 
was accomplished using ~nitab and the CDF command 
The area given in Column 4 is the percentage of programs that the A-12 cost 
variance exceeded. At 7.6 percent compk'te, the cost variance in the Program exceeded 
73.6 percent of other aircraft programs. At termination. the A-12 cost variance exceeded 
93.7 percent of other aircraft programs. The data indicate that the A-12 Program cost 
variances were exceptional when compared to other aircraft programs. 
D. FLX.ED-PRlCE VERSUS COST-lYPE CONTRACTS 
I. A-12 Cost Variances Versus Contract Type 
This analysis is conducted to determine the degree to which the selection of a 
fixed-price contract may have effected the cost overrulL~ in the A-12 program The mean 
cost variance ofa fixed-price contract is -21 ,02 percent. The median cost variance is 
-10,2 percent Fifteen contracts were included in the sample 
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The mean cost variance of cost-type contracts is -14 ,76 percent with a median 
value of . 6,05 percent. Thirty-nine contracts were in the sample. Table 18 provides the 
results of a comparison between the A-12 cost variances and cost variances based on 
contract type 
'-:-:-~-'--~-_---'-'~-~-:-~I L-'--'-'-~-~-~-'''---~-~-''--~--:-
Table 18. Contract Type Comparison 
The data indicate there is a difference in the cost variances based on contract type 
Compared to fixed-price contracts, 24 percent of programs experienced worse cost 
overruns while only 5 percent of cost-lype programs experience worse overruns 
This apparent difference was investigated using the non-parametric Mann-.... Vhi tney 
test. This lest dctennines ifthcre is statistical difference betWeen the mean oftwo 
populations. On the basis oCthe data, the test could not reject the null hypothesis that 
there was no difference, with alpha equal to .05 , This would refute the apparent 
difference shown in Table 18, Statistically, there is insufficient evidence to claim there is a 
difference in the cost variances experienced by contract type 
2. Aircraft Programs Vusus the Sample 
A second investigation was made to determine if aircraft programs experience 
different overruns than the overall sample. The null hypothesis could not be rejected with 
alpha equal to ,OS . There is not sufficient evidence to claim there is a difference in ai rcraft 
program cost variances and the overall sample. 
E. AD;JUSTMBNTS TO TtlE CONTRACT BUDGET BASE 
I. The Sample 
All programs examined experienced adjustments to the ellS In only two of the 
58 contracts examined was there a reduction in the CBB. The mean adjustment to the 
CSB is 53 percent with a median adjus tment of 46 percent 
S3 
The effects of inflation were disregarded based on assumptions stated in Chapter I. 
Hypothesis 4 and 5 were tested using the Mann-Whitney test. For each test alpha was 
selected to be ,05 
1. Hypothesis 4. l-1,obfr '" 1-1" ,,>< 
2. Hypothesis S. l-1,bbocft '" I-I,bb .. ",, " 
The alternative hypothesis in each case was the means were not equal. For each 
test, the null hypothesis could not be rejected with rather strong evidence. This indicates 
there is no statistical difference in the adjustments to the Contract Budget Base of 
different types of programs or different types of contracts. It should be noted that while 
the means of the eBB adjustments appear to show a wide difference the tests conducted 
are based on the variances of the data. A summary of the tests and criterion are provided 
in Appendix B. 
2. A-ll CBB Adj ustments 
Table 19 shows the EACs developed in Chapter IV for the A-12 program, and thc 
percentage change required to adju~t the originai CBB to the EAC. This percentage 
adjustment is then compared to the distribution of the sample adjustments in CBB. A 
percentile value is determined based on the required adjustment to the A-12 CBB 
r--I % TYPE 













Three EACs are shown in Column 1. The first is the PM's EAC at termination of 
the Program. The second and third EACs are the Rayleigh derived estimates presented 
earlier, The percentage adjustment that is required to increase the original CBB to the 
estimated EAC is given in Column 2, Column 3 is the distribution best modeling the 
distribution of CBB adjustments for the entire sample. In Colunm 4 is the percentage of 
programs that required a smaller percentage of adjustment to complete the EMD phase 
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Columns 5 and 6 a comparison oflh.: A-12 required adjustm.:nts versus the sample 
without aircraft included 
There were not t:nough data points fo r fixed-prict: programs or aircraft programs 
to providc a meaningful comparison 
3. Analysis 
A CBB adjustment to increase the program funding to $7_5 billion would require a 
57 pt:rcent increase in the CBB. A 57 percent increase would result in the program's 
adjustment being greater than about 53 percent of all other programs in the EMD phase 
A CBB adjustment to increase the program funding to $9 _069 billion would have 
required a 90 percent increase in the CBB_ This im;rease would have exceeded 77 percent 
of all other programs. The probability of the A-12 Program costing at least $9 billion is 
.70 
A CBB adjustment to increase the program funding to Sli billion would have 
required a 132 percent increase in the CBB. This would have exceeded 93 percent of all 
other programs. The probability of the A-12 Program costing at least $11 billion is.49 
F. COST VARIANCES OF EMD CONTRACTS 
1. Results of the Research 
This research examined fifty-eight total contracts. Table 20 summarizes the 








M"" OV % MEDIAN C"". "'" PERCENTILE 
Tablt: 20. EMD Cost Variances 
Fixed-pric.: contracts tend to have the highest cost variance of ei ther contract type 
The mean cost variance for fixed-price contral.1s is -2 1. 02 percent . Cost-type contracts 
require th.: greatest CBB adjustment, 57.24 percent, compared to fixe<i-price contracts 
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that require a 43 percent increase. Aircraft programs, in general, do not have exceptional 
cost variances, hut they do require above average eBB adjustments 
G. SU'1MARY 
This chapter examined the data from the sample S8 contracts and compared the 
results to the A-12 Program. Compared to the sample contracts, the overruns in the A· 12 
program, at 41 percent over programmed budget, were exceptional. To increase the 
funding for the program would have required an increase of approximately $S to $7 
billion. This amount of eBB adjustment would have been exceptional as well 
The final chapter. Chapter VI, reviews the research questions and the findings 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDA TlOl''';S 
A. REVIEW OF TIlE Rf,sEARCH QUESTIONS 
I. The Primary Research Question 
'Vere cost overruns in the A-12 Program e:U'eptional? 
The answer to this question was intended to be a simple yes or no In keeping 
with this intent the answer is yes. The cost variances in the A-12 program were 
exceptional when compared to the sample contracts in the EMD phase 
fhe justification for this finding is based on a comparison oflhe percentile values 
of the A-12 cost variances, measured against other programs at similar points of 
completion_ Table 6, in Chapter IV, shows the cost variances of the A- 12. Table 15 in 
Chapter V. provides the percentile values for the A-12 and the area oflhe distribution tbat 
exceeded the point values of the cost variances for the A-12. A test to see if the \;ost 
variances of the A- 12 were no different than other aircraft programs was conducted and 
the samc results were found . Thc results of the comparison to othcr ain;raft can be found 
in Table 17. in Chapter V 
The A-12 cost variances clearly exceeded a majority of other program's cost 
variances. Compared to the sample of 58 contracts. the cost overrun ofthc A-12 
exceeded 91 percent of the others. At termination, the A- 12 exceeded 94 percent of other 
aircrafl program's cost overruns. To ensure these results were not biased by the selection 
of the distribution, at least one difthent distribution was applied in (:ach Q\SC to detenninc 
if like results would be obtained. In each case the cost variance's percentile value 
remaim."<i extreme. The comparison distribution's percentile values can be found in 
Appendix B 
,'vleasurements of only the cost variances do not account for adjustments 10 the 
Contract Budgct Base. A program with a large cost variance t.:an be rebasclincd to 
eliminate the variance Ignoring the CBB adjustments would bias the findings The 
impact of CBS adjustments was tested in the subsidiary research questions 
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2. Subsidiary Research Questions 
What would the A-12 FSD program have cost if it continued to completion? 
It is likely that the program would have cost between $9 and $1 I billion, Based on 
a Rayleigh model estimate at completion and the MMAE methodology developed by 
Gallagher, the costs and probabilities for the e~'timates at completion arc as follows 
a, Given a June 1992, first flight date the program would have been 
completed in September 1999, The program would have cost $9 billion. The cumulative 
probability of the program exceeding this cost is .63 
b. Given a December 1992, first flight date the program would have been 
completed in January 200 I. The program would have cost $11 billion The cumulative 
probability of the program exceeding this cost is.49 
These results are consistent with the DoD ltl estimates contained in Table 3, in 
Chapter IlL The DoD IG estimates were prepared by the Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group 
The budget adjustments that would have been required to finish the program 
would have exceeded between 77 and 93 percent of al l other programs. To eliminate the 
cost variance would have required an above average budget adjustment 
Was the Secretary of Defense justified in terminating the Program for cost 
overruns? 
Yes. The cost variances in the A-12 Program exceeded 97 percent of all other 
programs, as shown in Table 15, in Chapter V. A budget adjustment between 89 and 132 
percent would have been required to finish the program, While this amount of adjustment 
to the budget would be within the distribution ofCBB adjustments, (See Table 19) it 
would have as a minimum t.-"Xceeded 77 percent of all other Contract Budget Base 
adjustments. 
Are there differences in cost overruns between aircraft programs and other 
types of EMD programs? 
No. There is imrufticient evidence to conclude that aircraft programs experience 
significantly different cost variances, The test results could not reject the null hypothesis 
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that there were no differences. The test showed there was no statistical difterence with 
alpha equal to ,05 
Are there dirrerences in cost overruns between fi xed-price contracts and cost-
type contracts for deve lopmental work? 
No. There is not suffici(!nt evidence to claim that fixed-price conlnu;ts experience 
statistically different overruns. As measured hy the Mann-Whitney non-parametric test , 
the null hypothesis could not he rejected with alpha equal to .05 
What is tbe average cost overrun of an EMD contract? 
The mean cost Qvcrmn for an E\1D contract is 13 .37 percent, as shown in Table 
20, in Chapter V, The mean cost overrun for aircraft programs is 1403 percent. The 
mean cost overrun for fixed-price contracts is 2 ! ,02 percent and the mean overrun for 
cost-type contracts is 14,76 percent , The research found thai the mean value for overrun~ 
tends 10 overstate the extent of the problem, The use of medians provides a more 
accurate picture. The median cost overruns for the above contracts ranged from 6,05 to 
10,2 percent 
To examine the impact ofrehaselining the percentage change in each contract's 
CBB was detemlin~ . The results o f this examination are providcd in Table 7, in Chapter 
IV. To eliminate the possibility that a normal rebaseline would have prevented the 
cxtraordinary OV~rTuns in the A-1 2 program, the required adjustment to the A- 12's eBB 
was examined 
Depending on the date of first flight (assuming it would be no later than December 
of 1992), the required CBB adjustment is between 89 and 132 percent. An adjustment of 
this magnitude exceeds approximately 77 to 91 percent of all other programs, The 
required mean adjustments were found to vary dependent on program and contract type 
The results ufthis investigation arc providt:d in Table 19, in Chapler V 
There is insufficient evidence to believe that the adjustment~ to the eBB vary 
depending on l,-ither program type or contract type, The apparent difference in mean 
values for the contract types was investigated using the Mann-Whitney tes\. The test 
showed that the null hypothesis could not be rejected 
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R. CONCLUSIONS 
I. The Decision to Terminate the Program 
~decision orlne Secretary of Defense to terminate the A-12 Program was 
lllliified. The A-12 Program experil:nced significantly different cost variances from other 
programs examined. Hypothesis t , the A-12 overruns were no different than other 
programs, was tested to determine if A-12 cost overrulls were the same as other EMD 
contracts, This was not proven. At tcnnination the A-12 Program was 41 percent ovemm 
from its baseline. This amount of overrun exceeded 97 percent of other programs in the 
sample, The test compared percentile values of the A- 12 versus the sample 
2. f'ixed-Price Contracts and Cost Ovcrruns 
Ihc assertion that the cause of the A-12's failure was due to dl!:UJ~ 
~act can not be suppon .. !! by the dall!, The selection of contract Iype is nOI 
a factor in preventing cost ovenuns The fixed-price contracts in the sample had a larger 
ovenun than cost-type contracts, 21.02 percent versus 14.76 percent. The median 
ovenun values were much closer: 10.2 versus 6.05 percent. Fixed-price contracts required 
smaller budget adjustments than cost contracts, Hypothesis 2 was tested to see if the 
ovenuns are the same. The null hypothesis, that there was no difference between cost 
ovenuns in fixed-price contracts and cost contracts, could not be rejected 
3. Aircraft Program Cost Variances 
The mean cost variance of aircraft programs is the same as other types of 
p~ This indicates that the cost ovenuns in an aircraft program will be no higher 
than any other type of program. Hypothesis 3, was tested tor differences in the mean 
overruns of aircraft programs and other types of programs. The null hypothesis could not 
he rejected, no significant difference exists, The median overruns of the sample examined 
were 6,13 percent for aircraft and 6,09 percent for other types of programs 
4. Budget Adjustments for Fixed-Price and Cost-Type Contracts 
The required budget adjustments for fixed-price and cost=lme contracts are the 
~ The budget adjustment is the amount, measured hy percentage, required to adjust 
the initially specified budget to the ending budget. In other words, it is the amount of 
additional money the program manager needs to finish the program. The budget 
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adjustment required to finish the A-J2 Program would have been bt->twccn a 77 and 93 
percent increase. The mean budget adjustment for fixed-price contracts is 44 percent and 
the mean budget adjustment for cost-type contracts is 57 percent. Hypothesis 4 was 
tested to see if there arc differences between the Contract Budget Base adjustments for 
fixed-price contracts and the eBB adjustments for cost-type contracts 
A visual inspection ufthe data would indicate a difference, hut the Mann-Whitney 
test showed no statistical ditlerence. This can be accounted for by the dispersion of the 
data. Prior to conducting the test the data was normalized by dividing each data point by 
its standard deviation. The null hypothesis, that there arc no differences, could not be 
rejected 
5. Budget Adjustmellts for Aircraft Programs 
Aircraft p..I.Qgr~quire about thc same amouJlLQf..lrndget~justment as other 
tr~pro~ The mean budget adjustment for aircraft programs was higher than 
other types of programs. The dispersion of the values was much greater for aircraft 
programs than for other types of programs, and the data were normalized prior to testing 
Hypothesis 5 was tested to determine if aircraft programs expcriencc greater mean eBB 
adjustmcms than other programs. Thc null hypothesis could not be rejected. There is no 
statistical differcnce in the mcan budget adjustments of aircraft programs and the sample 
6, Mean Values Versus Median Values 
Mean values overstate cost ovenuns To compare a program's overruns with 
other programs, the median cost ovcrrun should be used. The mean is a good measure of 
central tendency for data modeled by the "Kormal distribution, Cost ovemms are modeled 
by the Beta distribution, The use ofthe median is a more accurate measure of central 
tendency for skewed data. As shown in Figure 3, in Chapter II, the distribution of cost 
overruns is skewed to the left. The use of mean values can be misleading. For example, 
the mean cost variance of fixed-price contracts and cost-type contracts is -21 ,02 percent 
and -1 4,76 percent respectively. At first glance the conclusion could be drawn that 
fi xed-price contracts are signi ficantly different from cost-type contracts 
The median values for the cost variances offixed-price and cost-type contracts arc 
- 10.2 percent and -6.05 percent respectively. The median values show less difference by 
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contract type. The test of the hypothesis found no stali~1ical difference in cost variances 
based on contract type 
7. Cost Variances ofEMD Contracts 
The results of this research agree with prior research. ~~tl 
~tter with time. Programs less than 10 percent complete have a positive cost variance 
(cost underrun). From I I percent complete on programs tend to ex.perience cost 
overruns. From 11 to RO percent complete the cost ovenun increases with program 
length, The largest cost overrun for the sample, was from 71 to 80 percent complete and 
was negative 14.52 percent. The mean value of the cost variance of the sample was 
negative 13 .37 percent while the median value was negative 6,09 percent. Very few 
contracts were found to have positive cost variances at any point in the program A 
summary of the findings on cost variances is provided in Table I I, Chapter TV, and Tahle 
20 in Chapter V 
The observations of Abba and Christle and the empirical findings of Heise were 
confinned in tbat the cost variances tended to worsen as the program progressed This is 
shown in Table 11 , in Chapter IV 
8. Causes of Cost Growth 
rhe cause of the A-12's oost overruns are difficult to detennine, It was not the 
intent of this thesis to provide the answer to why the A-12 had exceptional overruns 
TIased on the dala examined, it appears that the Program encountered significantly greater 
technical challenges than were anticipated, which delayed first flight and increased cost 
The contracts examined in this research all showed variances from the baseline. 
The majority of these contracts experienced cost overruns throughout the program, The 
Rand report [Ref 10] found no single cause for Ihe cosl growth of weapon system 
programs. The report found a correlation bL'tween the size of the program and the length 
of the program and cost gro\VIh, The smaller the program, the grealer the variance and 
the longer the program is carried out, the greater the variance. 
A 1992 GAO report summarizes the problem of delennining the cause of cost 
growth 
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The weapon system problems we have r"'Poned in the past 2 years 
mirror those we reported in the 1970$ and the 19808. This doesllot imply 
that the history of weapon acquisitions amounts 10 a string of bad 
programs. The point is that, despite conscious attempts \0 improve the 
acquisition process, weapons still cost more, take longer to field, often 
encounter pcrfonnance prohlems, and, in many instances are difficult to 
produce or ~UppOlt The persistence of these problems reflects the fat--t 
that the design, development, and production ofmaior weapon systems are 
extremely complex technical processes,_ . .!n shon, it takes a myriad of 
things to go right for a program to be successful, but only a few things to 
go wrong to cause major problems.lRef. 27 p. 151 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. The A- 12 
fhe Govemment's decision to tenninate the fixed-price contract of the A-12 is 
justified, based on an examination of the data used in this research, The Government 
should continue to pursue the case in court and demand reimbursement for the 
unliquidated progress payments 
2. Cost .:stimating 
The findings of this research indicate that estimates at completion in EMD 
contracts are too optimistic. As shown in Tahle 7, the mean adjustment to the CBB is 54 
percent. Only two of the 58 contracts showed dO\Vflward revisions in the CBB. More 
emphasis should be placed on developing realistic estimates of the cost ofthe contract. A 
cost undenlln in the early stages of a program is a poor indicator of future mst 
perfonnance. Fully defining the scope of work before the start ofEr-.1D may help alleviate 
the problem. A longer Demonstration and Validation phase may be warranted in 
programs with substantial technical risk 
3. Fhed-Price Contracts for t:MU 
The belief that fixed-price contracts place the majority of the cost risk on the 
contractor is not supported by the data for EMD contracts. No statistical difference was 
shown in the median values for cost-type contracts and fixed-price contracts. While 
fixed-price contracts showed more extreme points than co~1-type contracts, this may have 
been due to the Government's reluctance to adjust the price of the fixed-price type 
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contracts. As shown in Table iO the Air Force has used a fixed-price type contract in the 
majority ofE~ID contracts that were examined. 
The decision to use a cost-type contract will not have any impact on the cost 
variance of the conlract The mean budget adjustment for fixed-price contracts was 44 
percent, thc median value wa~ 54 percent, while the mean budget adjustment for cost-type 
contracts was 57 percent and the median value was 45 percent. By examining the means 
for budget adjustments the conclusion could be drawn that the use of a fixed-price 
contra(;t would require a smaller budget adjustment. The use of median values would 
show thaI the use of a fixed-price contract would require a greater budget adjustment 
The mean values can be skewed by outliers, extreme values by very few programs 
D. AREAS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
1. The Rayleigh Distribution Model 
The Rayleigh model shows promise as a cost I;!stimating tool .Further research 
into optimizing this model for more narrowly defined programs should be examined 
Adjustment oflhe parameters oflhe model resulted in greater accuracy_ This research 
used only ten values to optimize the parameters for aircraft contra(.is, By using more 
values to optimize the parameters an even more refined model could be achieved 
The Rayleigh model proved to be a better estimator of costs at completion than the 
CPI techniques given an unstable baseline. in programs where the baseline is relatively 
stable the CPI technique is both easy to use and accurate, The advantage that the 
Rayleigh technique provides is the ability to provide estimates independent of the baseline. 
It was not the intent of this research to prove the value of the Rayleigh model 
The model was selected based on its ability to provide EACs independent of current 
estimales offinal w~'ts_ Other techniques exist for estimating costs that were also nOI 
examined 
2. FiIcd-Pricc Contrlu:ts 
This research indicates that the use of fixed-price contracts in developmental work 
is not inherently bad. All contracts examined had adjustments made 10 the eBB regardless 
of contract type, Additional work could examine in more detail the differences in cost 
variances hetween cost-type contracts and fixed-price type contracts 
APPENDIX A. CONTR-\.CT DATABASE 
This appendix contains the contracts used in the research. The agreement with 
OUSD (A&T) requires that the name of the contract and the contractor not be disclosed 
The contracts arc listed by number, The corresponding list of contracts can be released 
with the pennis."ion of the OUSD (MTl, The Jist of contracts used in tbis research is 
maintained by Dr. David V. Lamm, Systems Management Department. Naval 
Postgraduate School 
ABBREVlA nONS USED 
1 ACWP, The reported actual cost of work perfonned drawn from the database. 13 . 
2 A],LOC BUDGET Actual budget committed to the program 
3 HeWp The reported budgeted cost of work performed drawn from the database 
4. CBR. Contract Budget Base 
5 COM PL PT, Percentage completion point As measured by DCWP!ALLOC 
BUDGET 
6 CPo Cost Plus 
7 CPAF Cost-Plus-Award-Fcc. 
8 CPIF. Cost-Plus-lncentive-Fee 
9 CV. Cost Variance. Percentage cost variancc dctermincd by (BCWP-ACWP)IBCWP 
W Fl>. Finn-Fixed-Price 
II . FPIF. Fixed-Price-Incentive-Fiml 
12. FSD. Full-Scale Development, Equivalent to Engineering and Manufacturing 
Development (EMD). Drawn from the description in the DAES database. "DEY" as 
used in the DAES database is equivalent to EMD 
13 K Contracl 
14. K TYPE. Contract type 
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APPENDIX B. STATlSTlCAL INFORMATION 
This appendix provides the detailed statistical infonnation to support infonnation 
contained in the te>.'t. The appendix is subdivided into the following sa:lions 
A. Modeling of the Data 
B Distribution Information 
C Dcta Value Conversions 
D. Non-parametric Tests 
A. MODELING OF THE DATA 
The accuracy of the A-12 percentile values is dependent on how well the data were 
modeled by the specified pammeters To ensure that the percentile values were not biased 
by the choice of distribution, each data set was checked with a second distribution_ This 
section contains the graphical representat ions of the distribution oftbe data The graphs 
in this section were produced using BestFit [Ref 20] 
I. Sample: 0 to 10 Percent Complete 
Figure 7 shows the distribution of cost variances for all contracts from 0 to 10 
percent complete. The data were best modeled by the Nomlal distribution, with mean 
equal to 1.79 and standard deviation of 11.56 
Comparison of Input Distribution and Normal(1.79, 11 .56) 
t' Input 
.~ 0.04 f----'-+,---++ 
~ • Normal 
Values in 1011.1 
------------- ----------------- -----
Figure 7. Sample Data 0 to 10 Percent Complete 
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2. Sample Data: 11 to 20 Percent Complete. 
Figure 8 shows the distribution for cost variances of the sample, from 11-20 
percent complete. Thirty-seven contracts were included in the sample. The data were 
skewed to the left, and were best represented by the Beta distribution with parameters 
(2. 3, 1.07). 
'" ~
Comparison of Input Distribution and 8eta(2.30,1.07)" 41.55 
+ -34.69 
ILJ I npu t .~ 0.05 
• ~ 
figure 8. Sample Data II to 20 Percent Complete 
3. Sample Data: 21 to 30 Percent Complete 
Bet:a 
Figure 9 is the distribution of cost variances for contracts 21 to 30 percent 
complete. Thirty-four contracts constitute the sample. The data were centered near zero 
and were modeled by the Logistic distribution with parameters (-5 .27, 1 L 10) 
Comparison of Input Distribution and Logistic(-5.27,6.08) 
• Logist i c Ii I nput 
I 
I 
I Values in 10"1 
Figure 9 Sample Data 21 to 30 Percen! Complete 
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4. Sample Data 31 to 40 Percent Complete 
Fib'lJre lOis the distribution of cost variances in programs 31 to 40 pcr\.:ent 
complete. Thirty-seven contrn\;ts constitute the sample. The sample is modeled by the 
Logistic distribution with parameters (_808, 554) 
Comparison of Input Distribution and Logistic(-8.08,5.54) 
I nput 
• Logis ti c 
Values in 101\1 
Figure 10 Sample Data 31 to 40 Percent Complete 
5. Sample Data 41 to 50 Percent Complete 
Figure II is the distrihution of C{Ist variances in programs 41 to 50 percent 
complete. The data are skewed to the left. However, the degree of skewness does not 
warrant the selection of a Beta distribution. The Logistic distribution models the data. 
The parameters oflhe distribution are (-1 1.02,8 .08). 
Comparison of Input Distribution and Logistic(-11.02,8.08) 
0.06 ,-----,------,----,---,----,--, ~ I 
~OOTjj 
I 00?5~ ~7 :::Iue:;~ 1 ~:;2 0.0 
• Logistic 
1.2 
I npu t 
Figure 11 Sample Data 41 to 50 Percent Complete 
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6. Aircraft Programs: 0 10 10 Percent Complete 
Figure [2 provides the distribution of cost variances within aircraft programs, from 
o to 10 percent complete. Eleven contracts are used. The distribution is centered near 
The data are modeled by the Dela distribution with parameters (I .75, .83) 
E 
Comparison of Input Distribution and 8eta(1.7S,O.B3) * 
28.56 + -22.22 
D Input 
~ o_oo l-+-'---'-H'b..r!---+-+ 
• Bet a c 
Values in 1011.1 
Figure 12. Aircraft Programs 0 to 10 Percent Complete 
7. Aircraft Programs: 11 1020 Percent Complete 
Figure 13 provides the distribution of cost variances in aircraft programs 11 to 20 
percent complete. The Beta distribution modeled the data Eleven contracts were in the 
sample The parameters uflhe distribution are (1 .17, .56) 
Comparison of Input Distribution and 8eta(1.17,O.S6) * 23.49 
+ -21.52 
-ilij 
-{)9 -04 0 ,0 0.4 0.9 13 17 
Values in 10"1 
D 
• 




8. A ircraft Programs: 21 to 30 Percent Complete 
Figure 14 provides the cost variance distribution for aircraft programs 21 to 30 
percent complete. The Beta distribution models the data with parameters ( 1.43 , .64) 
Twelve contracts were induded in the sample 
Comparison of Input Distribution and Beta(1.43,0.64)" 15.13 
+ -14.30 
I n p ut 
• Beta 
Figure 14 Aircraft Programs 21 to 30 Percent Complete 
9. Aircraft Programs: 31 to 40 Percent Complete 
Figure 15 provides the distribution of cost variances in aircraft programs 31 to 40 
percent complete. The data are skewed 10 the len and are modeled by the Beta 
distribution Fourteen contracts were included in the sample. The parameters orthe 
distribution are (2.05, .94) 
Comparison of Input Distribution and Beta(2.05,0.94) " 
32.30 + -30.B6 O·'LUJjTli f '.' ~ . . J >I l11 
00 ! .·L~ 
-3.09 -247 -1.85 -1.23 -0.62 0.00 0.6 2 1.23 1.85 
Values in 1011.1 
o 
• 
Figure 15 A.ircrafi Programs 31 to 40 Percent Complt.-1e 
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I n put 
Beta 
10. Aircraft Programs: 41 to 50 Percent Complete 
Figure 16 provides the distribution of cost variances within aircraft programs 41 
to SO percent complete. The data are modded by the Logistic distribution with 
parameters (-1 2.63 , 10, 16). Ten contracts were included in the sample 
Comparison of Input Distribution and Logistic(-12.63, 1 0.16) 
0.06 ,---- ~----r-~----,--
E ~ 0.03 1--- ,-----,-----1----+ I nput 
~ • Log i s t ic 
Values in 10"1 
figure 16. Aircraft Programs 41 to SO Percent Complete 
II. Sample Contracts Cost Variance Distribution 
figure 17 provides the distribution of cost variances for all programs that had met 
or exceeded 80 percent complete, Forty contracts were included in the sample. The 
distribution was skewed to the left and was modeled by the lleta distribution. The 
parameters of the distrihution are (1.49, ,82) 
t' 




I Inp ut. 
.~ 0.03 ~--+-+-t--~F 
~ I • Bet a 
2.3 
Values in 10.1'.1 
Figure J 7 All Contracts at Least 80 Percent Complete 
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12. Distribution of Cost Contracts 
Figure 18 provides the distribution of cost variances, for programs with cost-type 
contracts, at least 50 percent complete. The data are skewed to the left and are modeled 
by the Beta distribution. Thirty-nine contracts were included in the samplc. The 
paramcters of the distribution are (1.65, AO) 
--------- ----------, 
Comparison of Input Distribution and Beta(1.65,0.40) * 64.01 
+ -62.28 
0.09 
I npu t E ~ 0.05 
• Betil 
0.006.2 -5.0 -3.7 
Values in 101\1 
Figure 18 All Cost-Type Comraets at I ,east 50 Percem Complete 
13. Distribution of Fixed-Price Contracts 
Figure 19 provides the cost variances for programs with fixed-price type contracts 
that are at least 50 percent complete. The number of cumracts included in the sample is 
15 The parameters of the Beta distribution are ( .95, .22) 
Comparison of Input Distribution and Beta(0.95,O.22) * 
1.07e+2 + -99.20 







-9.9 -7 .9 
Values in 101\1 
figure 19 All Fixed-Price Contracts at Least 50 Percent Complete 
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15. Distribution of Contract Budget Base Adjustments 
Figure 20 shows the distribution of adjustments to the Contract Budget Base, for 
all programs. The programs included had to be at least 70 percent complete and have 50 
percent of the total program included in the cost reports. The distribution of CBB 
adjustments is modeled by the Logistic distribution with parameters (53.57,30.21) 
Twenty-nine contracts were included in the sample 
Comparison of Input Distribution and Logistic(53.57,30.21) 
Input 
• Logis t i c 
Values in 10"2 
------------------~ 
Figure 20. Contract Budget Base Adjustments for the Sample 
B. mSTRIDUTION INFORMATION 
L. Statistics of the Distributions 
Table 21 gives the detailed statistics of the distributions that best modeled the data 
Column I is the type sample that is modeled. Column 2 provides the percentage 
completion brackets. In Columns 3 and 4 are the distribution's parameters. In Columns 5 
and 6 are the extreme values for the data. The extreme values do not include outliers that 
were discarded. The best distribution that modeled the data and the second best 
distribution are given in Columns 7 and 8 The accompanying Chi-squared values are 
provided in Columns 9 and 10 
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fable 2]. Detailed Distribution Infonnation 
2. Pen:entile Value lnfonnation 
Table 22 contains the percentile values for the samples based on the best and 
second best distributions. Columns I and 2 give the sample type and the percentage 
completion bracket. Columns 3 and 4 provide the 0 to I Bela value, ifapplicablc. In 
Columns 5 and 6 arc the _01 percentile and .05 percentile values for the given distribution 
The next best percentile values are given in Columns 7 and 8 
.05 .01 2ND 2ND 
~. 0101 Oto1 BEST BEST BEST 
SAMPLE COMPl BETA 0.05 0.D5 0.01 
0.2100 00000 
0:1300 00000 '17.50 
-13.42 -1840 
-21.29 
-42.54 -4314 -55,78 
0 ,1 194 
0."" 




rable 22 Percentile Value Information 
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I 
C. BETA VALUE CONVERSlONS 
The fieta distribution is a continuous distribution, with range 0 to I Cost 
variances can vary from negative infinity to positive infinity_ To model cost variances 
using a Beta distribution thc observed values must be converted to a range of 0 to I This 
is accomplished by using the following formula: h(B: v, w) + o[ I-([:i: v, w)l_ Where 
a;:>:x?: band ([3: v, w) - lul>-l(l _ u)1<>- l du . [Ref 12l 
The observed cost variances tended to assume onc of two shapes_ If the 
distribution was skewed to the left, with a majority of the observations clustering close to 
zero, thcn the distribution assumed a J shape, characteristic of the Beta distribution with 
(v-l)(w-l) < O. Ira relatively large number of observations occurred in the tail of the 
distribution then the distribution tended to assume a U shape where v < 1 and w < I 
The estimated parameters provided by BestFit were used to obtain the percentile 
values. The percentile values were then converted to values ranging from a :5: x :5: b by 
arithmetic manipulation of the original formula 
The distributions shown in Section A, have a Beta distribution ranging from 0 to 1 
superimposed over data ranging from a to b 
D. NON-PARAMETRIC TESTS OF THE HYPOTHESES 
1. The Maun-Whitney Test 
The Mann-Whitney Test tests for differences betwccn the means of two 
populations. The test statistic is given by: U - llu/o (f '" Z. For a two tailed test the 
decision criterion is: Reject 1-4 if Z :> -Zo'l or Z < z ,r. . For all four tests alpha is set at .05 
Therefore, al2 equals ,025. The value ofz.." equals 1.96 
2. lIypotbesis 2 
!-I f}' = ]l , . This hypothesis tests for differences in the means of fixed-price contracts 
and the mean of cost-type contracts. HQ- the null hypothesis, is the mean cost variance of 
fixed-price contracts equals the mean of cost-type contracts. H .... , the alternative 
hypothesis, is the means are not equaL This is a two tailed test. The purpose of this test 
is to detennine if the choice of contract type contributed to the exceptional cost uverruns 
in the A-12 program 
A requirement of the Mann-Whitney lest is the populations must be the same, 
except for possible locations of the mean The standard devlations or cost-type contracts 
98 
and fixed -price type contracts was significantly different: 28 ,23 and 16,13 respectively 
To standardize the two populations, each set of data was divided by its standard deviation 
before conducting the test. The test statistics for Hypothesis 2 are as follows 
From the results of the test the null hypothesis can not be rejected. There is no 
statistical difference in the means of the two populations The test statistics for this test 
are given below 
Statistic 
3, Hypothesis J 
~l ioCft = IlSOfl".\>! •. Hypothesis 3 tests for differences in the cost variances of aircraft 
contracts and other programs. This test examines if aircraft programs experience 
statistically different cost variances than other type of programs. The mean cost variance 
of aircraft programs is -14 ,03 with standard deviation 15 .69. The mean cost variance of 
other programs in the sample is -1 4. 10 with standard deviation 16.43. No difference was 
assumed between the two populations. As would be expe!,,'ted, with similar means and 




4. Hypoihesis 4 
l-i'bOlF = I-i, bb<' Hypothesis 4 is similar to Hypothesis 2 Hypothesis 2 tested for 
differences in the cost variances between fixed-price type and cost-type contracts 
Hypothesis 4 tests for differences in the mean budget adjustments. The mean eBB 
adjustment for fixed-price type contracts is 43.93 with standard deviation 59.84. The 
mean eBB adjustment for cost-type contracts is 57.24 wilh standard dl.-"Viation 54.37 
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The test statistics, fOf Hypothesis 4, are given below 
The null hypothesis could not be rejected There is no statistical difference 
between the mean eBB adjustments based on contract type 
5. Hypothesis 5. 
Il,_ = )l,~. Hypothesis 5 tests for differences in the eBB adjustments in 
aircraft programs versus other types of programs_ The mean eBB adjustment for aircraft 
programs is 94.15 with standard deviation 86_15_ The mean CBS adjustment for other 
types of programs in the sample is 42.99 with standard deviation 40.20 fhe test statistics 
arc given below r-
R1
-
T," I '"',,',, 
0.5384 
The two populations were divided by their respective standard deviations before 
the test to eliminate the difference in variance between the two populations. The test 
results indicate that the null hypothesis can not be rejl"<.'ted. Despite the apparent 
differences in the means ofthe two populations, there is insufficient evidence to claim that 
aircraft programs mean budget adjustments are greater than other programs. 
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